Promote cross-strait understanding

On April 10, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) called for the establishment of confidence-building mechanisms to stabilize security in the Taiwan Strait. Later, during a meeting with a group of US senators, Chen said the US should help the two sides of the Taiwan Strait build military confidence-building mechanisms. Even though such calls are conducive to building an atmosphere of goodwill and peace, whether they are feasible or have any substantial meaning is very much in question. Under the current circumstances in the Taiwan Strait, such calls are merely empty slogans.

This concept is a basis for neighboring or hostile "states" to build communication channels and increase mutual understanding through the exchange of information, thereby avoiding misunderstandings of each other's military objectives and preventing accidental wars. By setting up the rules for interaction, military activities and verification measures, the two sides can also strengthen mutual trust and achieve security and peace. Famous examples of such measures include the US-Soviet hotline in the Cold War era, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Theoretically, such measures across the Strait are necessary for easing China's military threat and preventing an arms race. But we cannot stay blind to the reality on the ground. Under the current political circumstances, the possibility of building military confidence-building mechanisms in the near future is minuscule.

If we look at past discussions and proposals on building these mechanisms across the Taiwan Strait, we can see that they have been a case of "hot in Taipei and Washington, cold in Beijing."

When a Taiwanese delegation of lawmakers visited China earlier this year to explore the plans for "three direct links," some members of the delegation suggested to Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛) that the two sides should establish such a military mechanism. But Qian believed it was a "political issue," adding that no foundation had been built for political dialogue. In more straightforward lan-guage, "there will be no military confidence-building mechanisms without `one China.'"

From Beijing's viewpoint, these measures only exist between sovereign states. Also, military means are an indispensable method for resolving the Taiwan issue. Given such an understanding, getting China to sign such a military agreement is simply a fantasy.

Even though a certain level of cooperation -- such as the dividing line along the middle of the Strait -- has existed since the early days, such tacit understandings have no binding force. Also, the situation today is very different from those days -- given that the cross-strait military balance is gradually tipping in favor of China and the US-China-Taiwan triangular relations are undergoing subtle changes.

Here we can see considerable differences -- even diametrically opposite ones -- in how the two sides view these military mech-anisms and mutual trust. Tai-wan's approach is to use military confidence-building mechanisms to defuse hostilities and create a harmonious political atmosphere. China's approach goes exactly the opposite way, which is to ease military tensions and threats only after reaching a political consensus.

Even if a miracle occurs and the two sides reach an agreement to establish these mechanisms, such agreements will still be meaningless as long as the two sides remain suspicious of each other and have no sincere intent to abide by the agreements. In other words, any cooperative agreement won't be of much help in actualizing peace and security as long as the fundamental factors creating the tensions remain unchanged.