Taiwan should also publicly reject the PRC's closing lines around the Paracel Islands and some of the PRC's baselines as inconsistent with the Law of the Sea Treaty. It should at the same time, however, revise its own extreme baselines which encompass islands far from its coast. It might also propose that all claimants renounce existing or future claims to exclusive economic zones around the features and suggest that sovereignty over the rocks and islands be decided by the International Court of Justice or a third party.
In terms of actions, Taiwan could promulgate (and adhere to) its own unilateral code of conduct which would be similar if not identical to that being negotiated by the claimants, and invite others to declare their support, concurrence, or adherence thereto.
Perhaps Taiwan might even be able to adhere to the ASEAN code as an "entity." Taiwan could also explain its recent withdrawal of military forces from Taiping as its contribution to peace in the region, and perhaps go one step further by replacing the Coast Guard personnel there with civilians. It should also renounce any new occupations, undertake no new construction, minimize its transient military presence in the South China Sea, be transparent about such exercises, and invite others to do the same.
And Taiwan should financially support the co-operative initiatives of the Indonesian-sponsored South China Sea Workshops, without attaching any political strings to its support.
Finally, Taiwan should reiterate former president Lee Teng-Hui's (李登輝) generous proposal of August 1995 to invest US$10 billion to establish a South China Sea Development Company to co-operatively manage the natural resources in the South China area. And it could take the initiative in proposing the specifics of the agreement, including the exact area to be co-operatively developed. To establish a precedent, Taiwan might also enter into discussions with the Philippines concerning joint fishing ventures in areas claimed only by Taiwan and the Philippines. Another possibility would be to lead a joint reconnaissance exploration of methane gas hydrates in the deep areas of the South China Sea.
These actions taken together could go a long way towards convincing ASEAN that Taiwan is -- and will be -- reasonable and co-operative about the problem. And they might even embarrass the PRC into taking a more reasonable position itself.
Mark J. Valencia is senior fellow of the research program at the East-West Center based in Honolulu.
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