Where does Bush go from here?

Last Wednesday, Washington and Beijing simultaneously declared that they had reached an agreement, and that the crew of the US surveillance plane being detained in China would soon be released. The announcements ended the nerve-racking standoff between the two that began on April 1. All the countries in the region, including Taiwan, sighed in relief. Many issues surrounding this incident and its possible consequences, however, remain worthy of careful analysis.

The letter to Beijing from the US ambassador to China, Joseph Prueher, apparently made Beijing happy. The letter handed by Prueher to China's foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇), stated that the US expressed "regret over [China's] missing pilot and aircraft," and is "very sorry that the entering of China's airspace and the landing did not have verbal clearance."

China's Xinhua News Agency (新華社), however, reported that the US had "shen-piao-chien-yi" (深表歉意), a much more apologetic term than the terms regret and sorry. Obviously, Beijing has given regret and sorry some very exaggerated Chinese definitions. As for the US, it has either agreed or encouraged Beijing to do so, despite President George W. Bush's open pledge that the US "will never apologize."

Although it was through such seemingly delicate diplomatic maneuvers that both sides were able to get what they wanted, the fact that such a major incident ended on the 11th day following a rushed diplomatic agreement tells us that the two countries were under tremendous pressure.

One can imagine the heat on the Bush administration.

First, things were already sticky enough because the 24 crew members and the plane were in Chinese hands.

Next, Bush made it into the White House with the support of conservatives. It became questionable how much longer Bush could enjoy his honeymoon as president, when the conservative camp was gradually turning up the volume of its demand that the US take on a more hardline position, and people were beginning to describe the crew as "hostages."

Finally, not all the policy-making positions in the administration had been filled. Its China policy was therefore undeveloped, making the administration unable to systematically analyze, study and resolve this crisis.

Under such pressures, it is understandable that Bush wanted to end this fiasco as soon as possible, even if it meant that he had subtly to do certain things that the conservatives disapproved.

The pressure faced by China was even more complicated.

First, the military may have made some very tough demands on the officials in charge of managing the crisis. In view of Defense Minister Chi Haotian's (遲浩田) harsh tone of voice, Western observers generally felt that the military was not too happy with the way the foreign affairs officials handled the crisis. Had the incident dragged on, the animosity could have grown, igniting a bomb over the issue of leadership succession before the Chinese Communist Party's 16th Central Committee convenes. The very thought of something like that happening makes many top-ranking officials ill.

Second, Beijing has long nourished a monstrous sense of nationalism. The collision essentially fed a mouthful of speed pills to this monster. Once nationalism became hyperactive, the people would begin to condemn their leaders for selling out, unless a channel for relief were found.