In recent years, the PRC has undertaken rapid modernization of its military and has continued to expand its national influence. With economic and commercial ties between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait becoming more intensive by the day and the CCP on the verge of dealing with its succession of power, the question of US arms sales to Taiwan has become increasingly a focus of attention at home and abroad. Despite the lively debate within Taiwan about arms sales, however, some of the viewpoints being argued may be overly simplistic.
The first simplistic viewpoint is that US arms sales to Taiwan are orchestrated by US "defense industry" interests. The argument goes that the US arms industry, influenced by the end of the Cold War, is in a slump. Therefore, the industry demands that the US sell weapons to Taiwan. Under pressure from lobbying and the contributions of arms manufacturers, the US then sells arms to Taiwan.
Manufacturers in the US arms industry do, in fact, frequently brief the US government regarding sales of weapons and equipment. However, there are four major problems with the assertion that US arms sales to Taiwan are orchestrated by "defense industry" interests.
The first is that it exaggerates the influence of the arms industry. If this assertion made sense, then we should have been able to buy F-16 fighters in the late 1970s and wouldn't have needed to delay until 1992. At the same time, we should have long since been able to buy the other weapons and equipment we want, and we wouldn't have to present an identical wish list for arms purchases every year.
The second problem with this assertion is that it neglects the seriousness with which Americans regard their roles in business and government. After leaving their posts, many US government employees transfer to jobs at arms companies in order to earn higher salaries. However, if they return to positions in the government, they adjust their perception of their role and handle the issue of arms sales with a scrupulous attitude. This adjustment in perception of a person's own role results from social influence over a long period of time as well as from having an effective supervisory system that makes it so individuals dare not transgress the ethics of government employment.
The third problem with the assertion is that it overlooks the complexity of the US' policy-making process. Any arms sales must seek the approval of all relevant departments and be able to bear pressure from organizations of every sort in society. Nearly any sale of arms will encounter opposition from different interest groups, and sales to sensitive regions encounter the most serious opposition.
The fourth problem with the assertion is that it neglects the independent nature of US government departments. This is particularly relevant in the case of the Department of Defense, which independently undertakes research and makes proposals for arms sales geared toward possible regional changes.
The second simplistic viewpoint often heard is that we shouldn't use arms purchases as a way to strive for a balance of military power between the two sides of the Strait. Many people believe that the goal of the US in selling arms to Taiwan is to make it so that Taiwan's military strength corresponds to that of the PRC on every level. In fact, the new administration's nominee for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, James Kelly, doesn't believe that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can achieve a balance of military power because the quantitative difference in strength is too great. Judging from the record of US arms sales to Taiwan over the last 50 years, the key point has never been to seek a balance of military power. If that had been the objective, the US government would long since have acted in accord with our wishes and sold us all the weapons and military equipment we desire.
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