A classical drama consists of five acts.
Usually, the key part to the story plays in the third act. In this regard, the North Korea policy of President Kim Dae-jung may well have something in common with classical theatre.
South Korea's constitution grants the president five years to complete his political mission. It seems Kim's efforts aimed at reconciliation with the North have reached an historic climax in the third year of his term: The unprecedented summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in June last year, followed by the equally unprecedented Nobel Peace Prize-award virtually guarantee Kim Dae-jung a prominent position in the pantheon of Korea's national history.
At mid-term the president has achieved more than had generally been expected in the beginning. In a democracy it is nothing unusual that the opposition highlights the negative points, and has difficulties acknowledging the achievements of the government.
It is also for this reason that regarding the Sunshine Policy I attach more weight to the judgment of foreign experts and analysts than to the opinion of the domestic opposition, which all too often is guided by petty partisan considerations.
Beyond the shores of this country the praise, even admiration, for Kim's policy is quite unstinted.
In an assessment of Kim Dae-jung's North Korea-policy, the summit-meeting in Pyongyang should receive special attention. In a dramatic manner this event has changed the coordinate system of politics in this part of the world. The summit created the political groundwork for peace and reconciliation with the aim of eventual unification.
Every single paragraph of the North-South-Declaration signed on June 15, 2000 contains a program aimed at a radical change of the political status quo on the divided peninsula.
Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy did not start with the historic summit meeting in Pyongyang.
There is a history before the crucial gathering in the North Korean capital, a history of relations very different from the ones we have become accustomed to ever since.
These relations were not focused on cooperation, they lacked harmony, and may be termed hostile, even belligerent.
When Kim Dae-jung came to power in early 1998 he inherited from his predecessor not only a desperate economic situation -- in itself a nightmare for South Korea's society -- which after years of economic achievement had forgotten what misery means.
Regarding relations with the North, the incoming president was confronted with a situation of tension and conflict, and virtually complete absence of any direct communication.
Some observers doubt whether Kim Dae-jung's predecessor Kim Young-sam actually possessed a consistent policy vis-a-vis the North, let alone a strategy. According to one observer, Kim Young-sam used to adjust his policy regarding North Korea more often than other people change their underwear.
It is a special irony that of all people this failed politician has become the most noisy opponent of the successful North Korea-policy of his successor. In the final stages of his presidential campaign back in 1997 Kim Dae-jung used to say that he was prepared.
Regarding North Korea this slogan may be called accurate: Kim laid out the basic principles of his North Korea-policy in his inauguration speech. It is remarkable that he has not strayed from them since.
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