The prevailing assumption in both east Asia and the US is that the election of a Republican to the White House will mean the adoption of more pro-military policies. That is largely true. The US military tends to favor the GOP, and Republican politicians have generally provided generous funding levels for it.
Nevertheless, being pro-military does not necessarily mean giving the Pentagon everything that it wants. The military leadership has already discovered that there are limits to President George W. Bush's generosity.
Instead of immediately proposing large increases in the defense budget (as many conservatives in his party advocate), Bush insisted that a comprehensive review of US defense strategy and weapon systems be conducted first.
That review is likely to recommend that a number of weapon systems be scaled back or eliminated. Indeed, during the campaign Bush and several of his advisers hinted that it might be possible to skip an entire generation of weapons in some cases.
Equally significant (although it has received less attention) is that the administration is not necessarily wedded to keeping 100,000 US troops in east Asia. That represents a significant change from US policy during the Clinton years. In both the 1995 and 1998 editions of its Security Strategy Report for the east Asia-Pacific Region, the Department of Defense explicitly pledged to maintain that level of forces.
Bush administration officials have had numerous opportunities to reiterate that commitment but have declined to do so. Indeed, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is on record as stating that there is nothing sacrosanct about the figure of 100,000 troops.
There are several reasons why the administration is likely to reduce the number of US military personnel stationed in east Asia. One factor is the mounting strain on the budget. Estimates from the Congressional Budget Office and private research institutes conclude that the military budget will have to be increased by US$50 billion to US$100 billion a year to fund all existing and planned weapon systems and current personnel levels. There is almost no chance that even a Republican-controlled Congress will approve such a massive increase in spending. That means that there will have to be some cuts in both weapon systems and force levels.
An important reason why at least a portion of the cutback in forces is likely to occur in east Asia is the growing public opposition to the existing troop levels in the principal host country: Japan. The massive US military presence on the Japanese island of Okinawa has long provoked hostility from the local population. But the tension has recently grown worse. Crimes committed by US troops, ill-considered e-mail comments by the US military commander (who questioned both the sanity and character of Okinawan officials), and the desire of Okinawans to recover some of the US military bases for more productive economic uses have all combined to stoke tensions to the worst point in many years. The pressure is now on to reduce the American military profile on the island, yet no other prefecture in Japan wants to host the troops that would have to be relocated. Nor is a new host country likely to volunteer. The final factor is the improved threat environment in east Asia over the past decade. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed one major threat, and the rapidly diminishing detente between North and South Korea another.
RSS