On the surface, US-ROK relations have seldom seemed better. South Korea's President Kim Dae-jung is expected to be the first Asian leader to visit President Bush in Washington, on March 7, and the new US administration has pledged its support for President Kim's North-South reconciliation effort and promised to continue its own dialogue with Pyongyang.
But, if things are going so well, why does everyone in Seoul seem so nervous? The answer comes down to one word: uncertainty. Seoul is uncertain about Washington's true intentions regarding rapprochement with North Korea; it is uncertain about North Korean intentions and Pyongyang's willingness to give as well as to take; and it is far from certain if President Kim can sustain domestic political support for his North Korea policy.
There is also uncertainly as to when and if North Korean leader Kim Jong-il will come to the South and even greater uncertainty over Seoul's ability to manage the visit successfully.
Seoul's primary goal for the Kim-Bush summit is "to alleviate anxiety."
President Kim will seek President Bush's personal, unqualified endorsement for the South's Sunshine Policy of reconciliation and engagement with North Korea.
While there will be a strong reaffirmation of America's defense commitment to South Korea and the need for continued military deterrence, the world's newest Nobel Peace laureate will also want Bush to wave some olive branches in Pyongyang's direction.
One source of anxiety is repeated reference to the need for North Korean reciprocity, which is being translated as "strict reciprocity" in Korea. It would ease Seoul's concerns if administration officials spoke of asymmetrical or progressive reciprocity instead, to acknowledge that the U.S. and South Korea have more room for maneuver than does Pyongyang.
On the other hand, it would not hurt President Kim, while praising progress to date, to lay out more clearly and publicly the specific steps he would like North Korea to take in order to demonstrate its commitment to the reconciliation process. Kim should also clearly lay out -- and President Bush should then endorse -- his specific objectives for Kim Jong-il's long-awaited visit to the South. This will put pressure on the North to move beyond symbolism and will help remove anxiety both in the U.S. and in North Korea about the meeting.
Kim Jong-il has bragged to visitors that he watches South Korean television and reads Southern newspapers. As a result, he must be fully aware of growing opposition to the Sunshine Policy, not because anyone thinks that engaging the North is bad, but because the process is increasingly being described as a one-way street. The North needs to demonstrate, by deeds as well as by words, that it is willing to enter into serious security discussions with the South.
To date, Pyongyang has refused even to acknowledge Seoul as a legitimate dialogue partner on security issues, insisting that such talks be with Washington instead. At a minimum, Pyongyang should signal its willingness, without preconditions, to accept Kim Dae-jung's call for a resumption of Four-Party Talks (involving the US, China and the two Koreas). This would have the added benefit of compelling the Bush administration to focus on North Korea issues in a positive way. (The North's seemingly preferred way of getting Washington's attention -- by creating a crisis -- is likely to have far less positive results.)
The greatest threat to President Kim's Sunshine Policy comes not from Washington or Pyongyang, however, but from Seoul. President Kim has failed to develop a bipartisan consensus for his policy approach toward the North.
Some opposition leaders, led by former President Kim Young-sam, have been demanding that Kim Jong-il issue an apology for the North's 1950 invasion and admit guilt for a variety of past sins before he is allowed to come to Seoul. Their goal appears not so much aimed at aborting the visit as ensuring that President Kim gains little domestic credit for this significant accomplishment. When pressed, opposition leaders will acknowledge that any future South Korean leader would have little option other than to continue Kim Dae-jung's outreach program.
But scant effort has been made by either side to craft a bipartisan approach that would put the peace process first.
This is where President Kim needs to wave a few olive branches of his own. As one frustrated Korean put it, "President Kim has spent more time consulting with the Americans and Japanese on his North Korea policy than he has with the Korean people themselves."
In order to alleviate anxiety, President Kim needs to exert as much effort mending fences at home as he does building bridges abroad, since international support for his policies will be for naught if domestic consensus cannot be achieved.
Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
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