There is much talk these days that the US should play a more active role in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. But is this possible with the constraints we have imposed on ourselves?
In the last speech the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia gave in that capacity, he stated that "there is an entire set of Taiwan related issues ... such as arms sales, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, and the question of transits by current and former leaders of Taiwan ..." I was struck by the inclusion of "transits" on a par with arms sales as an issue. We have, in fact, always categorized our rules about such things as transits and visits by senior leaders of Taiwan as "policies." They are more accurately guidelines for implementing policies.
Whether called policies or guidelines, however, many of them are demeaning, and place constraints on our communicating with each other. Transits and visits, including those experienced more recently for the first time by the new government in Taiwan, are examples of that. Who we welcome to our country, who we do not, or who comes just to visit or do business, are domestic matters.
That the PRC, so frozen in its concept of sovereignty, of all countries, should complain and even threaten harm to Sino-US relations should we exercise a fundamental sovereign right, makes our conduct all the more bizarre.
The visit in 1995 by then president Lee Teng-hui (
Public Law 103-416, sec. 221, states that whenever the president of Taiwan or any other high-level official of Taiwan shall apply to visit the US for the purpose of holding discussions with US federal or state government officials concerning trade or business with Taiwan that will reduce the US-Taiwan trade deficit, prevention of nuclear proliferation, threats to the national security of the US, the protection of the global environment, the protection of endangered species or regional humanitarian disasters, the official shall be admitted to the US, unless the official is otherwise excludable under the immigration laws of the US.
The "otherwise excludable" phrase refers to illegal conduct or contagious health problems and, inevitably, also includes the phrase, "unless the Secretary of State personally determines that the alien's admission would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest."
In this latter case, however, the secretary is obliged to furnish the chairmen of the judicial and foreign policy committees of both houses of Congress, with an explanation in a timely fashion.
In the case of Taiwan, the law deliberately makes the purposes of the visit broad enough to encompass almost anything. The process whereby the secretary gives notice of denial to the Congress is not politically feasible, especially with an issue involving Taiwan. The result is that the State Department can no longer realistically invoke policy to deny visas to Taiwanese leaders. To visit or not to visit is a matter to be worked out voluntarily between the two governments. This is largely true of transits as well.
Prior to the Lee visit, the US law was not as specific as it is now. The PRC, also, at that time, may not have been familiar with our law. Given the history of this issue since then, however, it is difficult to believe that the PRC is not intimately familiar with the US laws and regulations on this matter. Yet, given that it is almost impossible that the US government could prevent such a visit today, there are still public warnings emanating from Beijing regarding the travel of not only a Taiwan president, but an ex-president, now a private citizen, of Taiwan.
Lee was branded a "troublemaker" by some when he came to the US in 1995. Should he come again, under the present circumstances, who would be the "troublemaker?"
But the larger question still is whether the rules of the conduct of the US-Taiwan relationship should be changed. Isn't it as demeaning as ever for us still to be placed in such a predicament? Are we led into believing that the PRC could rightly regard our treating Taiwan officials as private citizens as a violation of their unofficial status? But now that such precedents have been in place for so long, how do we work around them? Certainly not by announcing a change in "policy." That might be a more satisfying way for Taiwan, and many here who support it, but the tensions that would result would not be helpful to either the US or Taiwan (beyond making it feel good).
Of course, we could all look back to 1979, when the rules of conduct for this unofficial relationship were unilaterally written by the US side. The measure of what to do was then too focused on what impression each rule would have on the PRC, and not enough on the implications for the US. What if we had then, for example, decided that all the people of Taiwan, with whom we were to continue an unofficial relationship, were private citizens. Foreign private citizens who are not excludable for other reasons, are free to go anywhere in the US they want, and see whomever they want. US citizens, and officials can see any private person wherever they choose.
What a different world that would be for this relationship. Communication between the US and Taiwan would not be the problem it is today. In this increasingly complicated relationship, the need to communicate at all levels and on all subjects, becomes ever more necessary. How else can the US take a more proactive role in encouraging dialogue or preventing conflict in the Taiwan Strait without better communications with the leadership there? Questions about who we could meet, talk to, dine with, and where, in our own country, would all be moot. This kind of relationship, in fact, exists in many countries which do not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Taiwan would not necessarily like it. There would be less need to strive for more symbolic "official" activity. But substantively, both countries would gain, and the relationship would be greatly strengthened. And the movement toward this kind of unofficial relationship need not be publicly formalized, but just gradually implemented. In addition, in the high-tech world that already exists, videophones and other means to communicate at any level would make the difference even more imperceptible.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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