It is never too late to admit mistakes as long as it helps clear the picture.
Stanley Roth, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific research under former US president Bill Clinton, once called Taiwan a "liability" and a "troublemaker" in cross-strait relations. In his recent trip to Taipei, he praised President Chen Shui-bian (
Roth's comments opens up discussion on Washington's view of the Chen administration since last March 18, when the DPP defeated the KMT in the presidential election.
It also illustrates the inherent and contributory reasons for the current cross-strait stalemate as well as potential solutions to the deadlock.
Roth emphasized that Taiwan should worry more about improving relations with China than with the US, because ties with Washington are already excellent, while ties with China are "broken and need to be fixed." In other words, since Taipei and Washington have successfully established good channels of communication, establishing ties between Taipei and Beijing is now imperative for the prosperity and security of Taiwan.
He also criticized China for bypassing Chen's regime, while embarking on what he described as "a united front strategy" of cozying up to opposition parties and key business leaders in Taiwan. Such a negative attitude toward Chen, according to Roth, is extremely unwise despite the fact that there are three years left in Chen's term.
Roth's statements seem to suggest that if Beijing continues to refuse to enter into a dialogue with Taipei while continuing to upgrade its military, pressure will build on the US to "do more" for Taiwan in other ways. Therefore, the ball is in China's court now.
Nevertheless, Roth criticized Chen's government for failing to respond more positively to what he saw as a recent softening of rhetoric by Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛) who stated that the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are "both parts of the same `one China.'" In this regard, Roth overlooked the implication of Chen's New Year's Eve address on cross-strait relations.
In that address, Chen has clearly stated that "the integration of economies, trade and culture can be the basis for a new framework of permanent peace and political integration." This is the official response to Qian's new interpretation of the "one China" principle.
While he encourages both sides of the Strait to map out an "interim agreement" to solve mutual differences, Roth argued that it is up to Beijing and Taiwan to decide the contents of the agreement. The US should not play any role in working out a full-scale deal.
The key element, Roth added, was for both sides to have "the political will" to resolve the longstanding dispute. Although both Roth and Chen agreed that an "interim agreement" is only a conceptual proposal, it is indeed similar to some parts of Chen's idea of "political integration."
Both concepts entail a broad framework under which both sides could live with each other. As for the procedure of establishing the framework, it is up to Taiwan and Beijing to decide jointly.
It is no surprise that the Bush administration would adhere to the same three pillars of Clinton's policy on cross-strait ties: adherence to a "one China" policy, insistence on peaceful resolution of the cross-strait dispute, as well as an emphasis on the resumption of cross-strait dialogue.
In addition, Washington will pressure Beijing to resume dialogue with Chen, or at least urge Chinese leaders to deal with Chen directly.
The Bush administration should go beyond publicly urging Taipei and Beijing to seek "meaningful dialogue" by privately offering to facilitate it. Being a "facilitator," rather than a "mediator" will bring about more constructive results in terms of cross-strait interaction.
One possible starting point might be for the US to invite Beijing and Taiwan to discuss issues from the "middle ground." For example, while Qian has claimed that "anything can be discussed," Chen has made reference to "a new mechanism for political integration." If the two sides can put aside ideological disputes and begin a "quiet, serious conversation" about the practical issues, Taipei and Beijing might realize, without compromising on their principles, that "what seems so elusive today becomes more realistic tomorrow."
As both sides will join the WTO later this year, there is no way either side can avoid some form of official contact. Chen's statements have offered another olive branch to Beijing, it is time for the Chinese government to respond now.
Liu Kuan-teh is a political commentator based in Taipei.
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