This can either be a goodwill gesture or a provocation, but the purpose is quite obvious: to regain the initiative on the "small three links" issue. Because non-governmental negotiations do not mean a reopening of official channels for dialogue, Beijing will continue to control the rhythm of cross-strait dialogue.
What comes next will depend on how Taiwan interprets Beijing's pitch. "Interpretation" is an important skill in negotiations. From 1977 to 1978, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance handled the normalization talks with China. Later on, Beijing did not dare to trust Vance because of his lawyer-like approach to problems and his reluctance to take a stronger stance against the Soviet Union. Therefore, after one meeting with Vance, Beijing gave word to President Jimmy Carter: "Sino-US relations are not a diplomatic issue, but a political one," and therefore require long-term strategic considerations. That was "interpretation." Its purpose was to let the White House take over China affairs from the hands of career diplomats in the State Department. Beijing's strategy later proved successful, as national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski took over the leading role in China policy from the hands of Cyrus Vance. Of course, it also had to do with the power struggle between Brzezinski and Vance at the time, but Beijing's "political, not diplomatic" interpretation undoubtedly played a catalytic role.
Ball in Taiwan's court
Therefore, the ball will be back in Taiwan's court as Beijing changes its attitude toward the "small three links." Should Taiwan respond by "singing its own tune" (Beijing defines the small three links as a local affair, but we interpret it according to our own definition)? Or should it respond with a "delay tactic" ("domestic affairs" is neither concrete nor clear enough and can be discussed later; but we can first discuss the the details of the "small three links"); or a "chicken and egg" argument (without first building mutual trust through the "small three links", how can we reach a consensus on "one country's internal matter"?); or a "bigger incentive" (simultaneously planning the big and small three links, and letting them become parallel policies)?
But no matter how Taiwan responds, it will have to consider the overall negotiation strategy. It will have to watch the publicity effects of any card it lays down. Beijing places considerable importance on publicity skills when it comes to negotiations, and Taiwan should not stay idle and look on. Now that Taiwan has already set up a media stage to trumpet the "small three links," it must make sure that the stage is not carrying "two shows." Taiwan will also have to try its best to control the agenda and rhythm of cross-strait interaction. This will be a major test of Taiwan's wisdom.
Liu Pi-jung is a professor at the department of political science, Soochow University.
Translated by Ethan Harkness and Francis Huang
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