Links dialogue a test for Taiwan

On Dec. 28, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it was willing to cooperate with Taiwan's plan for the "small three links" (小三通) by having non-governmental organizations on each side engage in talks on related issues under the principle of it being "one country's internal matter." This approach is a change from Beijing's previous cool attitude toward the small three links, and it makes one even more suspicious about China's real intentions.

It's obvious that China isn't willing to "put the ball in Taiwan's court" or raise expectations about the small three links. As long as Taiwan doesn't return to the "one China" principle, Beijing won't let Taiwan's new government enjoy any improvement in cross-strait relations. With the continued pressure, China hopes to force Taiwan to change its policies. In China's eyes, the small three links policy is only a delaying tactic by Taiwan to postpone the "big three links" (大三通) and is camouflage for avoiding the "one China" principle. From China's point of view, giving an enthusiastic response to the "small three links" now would leave people with a mistaken impression that cross-strait relations were already gradually getting back on track and would disrupt the strategy they have designed for exerting pressure on Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) government. Therefore the best response is to treat the small three links coolly.

China's classic negotiating strategy

In fact, ignoring the issue of the small three links raised by Taiwan is a classic example of China's tactic of "controlling the agenda." A US expert on China, Richard Solomon, discovered this in his research on China's negotiating behavior. When Richard Nixon stepped down because of the Watergate case, China didn't have a feeling for what the policies of his successor, Gerald Ford, would be toward China. Therefore, they adopted a tactic of pressuring Ford to try to force him to declare his position. The position they adopted was the passive stance used throughout all of 1975, when they refused to discuss any other issues during Ford's visit to China.

At that time, Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) held the post of vice premier. When he accepted an interview with the media in June of that year, he made a special point of saying, "whether or not there is something in particular to discuss, Ford is welcome to pay a visit to Beijing at the end of the year."

In September in New York, Henry Kissinger made a cautious inquiry to China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qiao Guanhua (喬冠華), about the possibility of making a joint statement during Ford's visit to China. Qiao's reply was, "we have no opinion on the matter." Actually this was all intended to send a message that the only thing Beijing wanted to discuss was "normalization of relations." If the US didn't want to discuss the matter, then even supposing Ford visited China, it would be in vain and would become an awkward journey with no clear purpose.

On the other hand, if a topic is one that Beijing doesn't want to discuss, they also have ways of controlling the agenda and making it impossible to broach. In 1975, Kissinger once indicated to Mao Zedong (毛澤東) that the US was already prepared to consult or provide aid on defense matters. Mao's reply was, "We shouldn't discuss problems pertaining to the military right now. Let's come back to that question after war has broken out." In one brilliant stroke, the question was put aside. No discussion means no discussion.