How cross-strait relations will evolve this year depends, to a large extent, on how the two sides proceed on three major issues, namely, Taiwan independence, the "one China" issue and what we might call "the WTO formula."
To better assess cross-strait relations, it is essential to understand the core interests -- those interests which cannot be compromised -- of the two sides. Beijing's core interest is its eventual reunification with Taiwan, and any deals it strikes with Taipei must contain a commitment to this goal. Taipei's core interests are its dignity and peace across the Taiwan Strait and any deals it strikes with Beijing must guarantee these requirements. Both sides also have common interests in creating long-term peace and greater prosperity. Any political solutions should take care of the core interests of the two sides while promoting their common interests.
This option will be extremely costly for Taiwan and cross-strait relations for a number of reasons. Firstly, it cuts directly into Beijing's core interests and will inevitably provoke a strong reaction, including a possible massive military response. Secondly, from a geopolitical perspective, Taiwan's geographical proximity to China limits its range of choices on this fundamental matter of independence or nationhood, which is why most people in Taiwan prefer the maintenance of the status quo.
Thirdly, it has already driven more people in China to support preparation for a military solution and weakened the influence of China's moderates who prefer a more accommodating approach. A consensus is currently taking shape in Beijing that it cannot expect peaceful reunification with Taiwan unless it is fully prepared to fight. Fourthly, it does not constitute, nor does it serve, the core interest of Taiwan as it is bound to cause prolonged instability in cross-strait relations and, in all likelihood, military conflict. Taipei would therefore be well-advised to continue to distance itself from this option. At the same time, Beijing should look beyond its "one country, two systems" model to explore a more extensive range of models for future reunification.
If the two sides can proceed in such a spirit, they should eventually negotiate a package deal, a kind of framework agreement governing their future relations. This deal should stipulate, inter alia, that Taiwan does not seek independence and that Beijing renounces the use force against Taiwan. It should also stipulate that both sides must engage in arms control and confidence-building measures, that they agree to put an end to their mutual hostility and conduct mutually beneficial cooperation in a wide range of areas, economically, technologically, and even politically, on the basis of equality and mutual respect; and that both are committed to seeking an eventual peaceful reunification on terms acceptable to both of them.
With such qualifications as "eventual," "peaceful" and "terms acceptable to both sides," Taiwan should be assured of maintaining its dignity and long-term, stable relations with Beijing prior to a final solution to the unification issue. Beijing will also come to see that under such a deal, though it falls short of formal reunification, China will maintain its dignity in the coming decades, Taiwan will not seek independence, the two sides will become friends engaged in extensive bilateral cooperation in the interest of peace, modernization and greater prosperity, and reunification will be achieved when the conditions are right.
Beijing's fear is that any retreat from its "one China" policy will lead to "the permanent partition of China into two independent countries." Some political decisions have to be made on how to re-establish a consensus on this issue. The two sides should agree on some form of a broadly-defined "one China" (廣義的一個中國) or an inclusive "one China" (包容性的一個中國). This approach may indeed give Beijing more advantages than Taipei in the international arena, but any other approach will not necessarily expand Taiwan's space in that arena. A broadly-defined "one China" seems the lowest common denominator that the two sides may still share.
Taipei should be encouraged to re-embrace, in its own way, some form of "one China" such as "one China, with each side having its own interpretation" (一個中國, 各自表述), while Beijing should be flexible about such a concept. If the two sides can take steps in this direction, it may start the ball rolling and provide a much needed minimum level of political trust between the two sides, thus opening the way for the resumption of stalled dialogue and even a possible breakthrough in cross-strait relations. It is still difficult for Beijing to openly support the concept of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation," as it may imply Beijing's recognition of the ROC. But the phrase has a kind of creative ambiguity, which could enable both sides to save face and work for their common interests until a better solution is found. Beijing may choose to endorse it indirectly and informally and, if need be, with qualifications.
Conditions for compromise on the "one China" issue may not be mature yet, but neither side should lose sight of opportunities for a possible breakthrough on this issue. In fact, both sides have already made some efforts towards accommodating each other's most pressing concerns on the matter. International media have focused on concessions made by Chen Shui-bian (
A good opportunity for re-establishing bilateral contact exists in the two sides' forthcoming accessions to the WTO. Indeed, if the two sides can demonstrate the necessary political will, it will be possible for them to treat the existing arrangement within the WTO as a mutually acceptable de facto model of a broadly-defined "one China" (at least applicable to their trading relations), under which both sides can treat each other on equal terms and carry out large-scale, mutually beneficial cooperation.
From Beijing's perspective, its concern about the legal status of Taiwan in the organization has been alleviated by Article XII of the Agreement Establishing the WTO and its Explanatory Notes, which make a distinction between a "state member" and a "separate customs territory member." From Taipei's point of view, the WTO formula has safeguarded Taiwan's unique identity and given it equal status with China as a member of a major international organization. Taipei has also acquiesced in the name of "Chinese Taipei" as a "shortened title" for its full name in the WTO.
If the two sides can proceed in the spirit of mutual understanding and common interests and respect this delicate WTO formula as well as each other's sensitivities, it will be possible for them to cultivate a habit of dialogue and cooperation on many issues of mutual interest, at least within the WTO framework. If they do not demonstrate sufficient political will, however, they may turn the WTO into nothing more than a new battleground for political confrontation, which will not serve the interests of either side.
This de facto, broadly-defined, "one China" model is itself a new regime and an overwhelmingly unifying element in cross-strait relations. Furthermore, it is not excessively intrusive or threatening and is certainly conducive to reducing tension between the two sides and developing their common interests. This model of mutual engagement may facilitate a political consensus between the two sides on the "one China" issue. With mutual cooperation holding out such huge prospects for mutual gain and, on the other hand, conflict between the two carrying potential for such huge losses, both sides should strive for the best prospects for their bilateral ties and for their common interest of securing long-term peace and greater prosperity.
Zhang Wei-wei is Senior Research Fellow at the Modern Asia Research Centre, Geneva University.
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