Although his appointment as secretary of state was expected, once it was announced, the media launched into speculation on what kind of secretary of state Colin Powell would be. Statements he made as chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff are being analyzed in great detail. In his new role, there will doubtlessly be changes in his views -- some based on his personality and experiences, some by the nature and direction of the new administration, and some by events as they unfold. But some of the problems we face today are not resolvable by any of the above, but by time, so expectations should be tempered
accordingly.
Powell has walked in the corridors of power for many years. He knows how government operates -- especially in national security agencies -- and he already knows many of the people he will be working with. His public statements, and those he expressed in his book, are normally read as being cautious. He believes the military should only be committed when vital interests are at stake, when there is a clear goal and the clear support of the people, when there are overwhelming resources available to assure a victory, and when an exit strategy has been decided. That seems to me to be the wish of most military leaders.
There are, inevitably, those who question whether he as secretary of state would continue to maintain the same views. Do "vital interests" include American values as well as security interests, or where will he stand on conflicts that are based on moral differences, for example. These questions must pose a difficult dilemma for him. As a soldier, he naturally opposes soldiers being used as pawns to resolve political differences unless it clearly threatens national security. But at the same time, in devoting so much of his energies to help the disadvantaged, moral values must weigh heavily with him as well.
As America's top general, he has had ample exposure to the State Department and its people over the years, but he will nonetheless be stepping into a different world. It reminds me of a couple of personal experiences, on a far smaller scale of course, that illustrate the point. As a rifle platoon leader in the Korean War, sitting in the trenches, reading a stale copy of the Stars and Stripes newspaper, I was jolted by a headline that read "Acheson: [the late former secretary of state] combat troops may be sent to Berlin [to break the Soviet blockade]." It struck me very quickly that Acheson was talking about us, taking on some more fighting. I didn't think much of the idea.
Many, many years later, on my assignment as international affairs advisor to the commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I saw the differences in perspective from the other side. The students were military personnel with the rank of colonel or equivalent from all services, who had been assigned there for a one-year course. One of the purposes, like the war colleges, was to broaden their vision on how their objectives in the military fit with the objectives and responsibilities other government and private sector agencies had with regard to national security.
Usually, in the first few months of each class, in the students' minds diplomats ranked near the bottom, in contributing to our national security -- perhaps just a notch above traitors. By the end of the one-year course, however, it was both amazing and gratifying to see how their perspectives had changed. We all had a role to play in a common objective.
Powell is well beyond that level. His responsibilities will change from what is necessary to be prepared to fight a war, to what is needed to avoid it. The department he will lead, its people and the advice he gets, have been structured for that purpose since the beginning of the Republic. He will find some who have had experiences with the military. Others he will have worked with in the National Security Council (NSC). With this background he will doubtlessly have more than one difference of option with the State Department and the NSC on issues and problems.
Now he will be arguing for the State Department, for its budget and for its side of the issues. Given his wide and respected experience, he will be a cabinet heavyweight on important matters of national security. But I believe his responsibilities will guide him, and it will be more often than not, he will take a stand that reflects on where he sits -- next to the president and representing the State Department.
Inevitably, there will be comparisons between Powell and past generals who became secretary of state -- Marshall after World War II, and Haig when Reagan was elected. One observer wondered if Powell will broaden his vision as Marshall did, or narrow his focus in line with his experience, as Haig did. I never met Marshall, but I have met Powell and Haig. I believe Powell has already demonstrated that he will be much more like the former.
He will also be the highest, but by no means the only, senior member of the Bush Administration who knows Asia. It will be in sharp contrast to the Clinton years. No wonder China is wary of the Bush crowd. Perhaps more important than the differences over TMD or arms sales to Taiwan, dealing with an American leadership that now has a better knowledge of Asia reduces the advantages China has had in negotiating with America.
And the secretary-designate not only knows Asia, but Taiwan as well. I remember accompanying a visiting very senior Taiwan military leader to Powell's quarters for a breakfast meeting. The general displayed considerable knowledge about Taiwan, but more important, he showed great interest in and respect for the briefing he was getting on the cross-strait military situation at that time.
As a former Foreign Service officer, I have a special reason for applauding the choice of Powell as secretary of state. Of the three generals in our history who received this appointment, Haig made little change in the Department, Marshall did and Powell definitely will. Among many changes he made, Marshall established the special role of the Intelligence and Research Bureau in providing him with the objective analysis he wanted. I served there for four years, long after that time, but the system he initiated remains today.
Powell can do much more, not only in raising the morale there by his stature and the role he will have in the foreign-policy decision making process. Setting clearer goals for the bureaus, insisting on a more efficient department in both management and policy making, at all levels, will make the department, not just the decretary, the player it ought to be in shaping and conducting American foreign-policy.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The article only represents his own position.
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