Koreans are openly nervous about what the election of George W. Bush portends for the Korea peace process, but many also seem privately hopeful that the incoming President might, as one security analyst put it, "save us from ourselves."
The anxiety is based on the assumption, in my view, grossly exaggerated that a Republican administration will take a more hardline, combative approach toward North Korea that could somehow undermine the South's policy of engagement with the North. No one in South Korea wants to see this happen. But, there are many who are nonetheless concerned about the current fast pace of rapprochement and especially about what they perceive to be its one-sided nature. They are therefore hopeful that a firmer US approach might have a sobering effect on Seoul while also encouraging, if not compelling, Pyongyang to be more forthcoming in its dealing with the South.
It is important for Bush to send an early signal to both Koreas that his administration is committed to the process of engagement and fully supportive of ROK President Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy.
This includes signaling continued support to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework under which the North froze its earlier nuclear research activities in return for heavy fuel oil deliveries today and the eventual construction of two less proliferation-prone light water nuclear energy reactors -- construction is underway with Seoul (and Tokyo) scheduled to pay the lion's share, although US financial obligations remain considerable.
America's commitments to its allies and agreements with others do not change when administrations change; the guiding principle is US national security interests. Support for the Sunshine Policy and continued adherence to the Agreed Framework (as long as Pyongyang continues to honor its promises) are in our national interest.
A last minute trip to North Korea by President Clinton would be counterproductive to the broader Peninsula peace process and should not occur; President-elect Bush should privately urge President Clinton not to go. However, Bush should be prepared to continue high-level contacts to signal (to Seoul as well as to Pyongyang) America's continued commitment to the peace process and to more fully ascertain the North's perspectives while ensuring that the North also understands Bush's views. A general timetable and set of milestones should also be set for continued high-level interaction between the two countries, to include an eventual meeting between Chairman Kim and President Bush.
A significant breakthrough in ongoing missile negotiations is not sufficient to justify such a meeting, nor should these talks detract from the broader Peninsula peace process. Many South Koreans have also expressed concern that they might be asked to shoulder the costs of a missile deal, as was the case with the Agreed Framework. Bush needs to provide assurances in advance that this will not be the case.
I would recommend the following game plan. As they are today, the missile talks should be aimed at accomplishing a variety of objectives. First is a halt to the North's destabilizing missile export program -- this should be the easiest to deal with since, from Pyongyang's perspective, only money and not national security is involved. On a very good year, Pyongyang can only hope for about US$100 million in revenues for its missile sales.
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