Two types of "Taiwanese consciousness" are taking shape, "native Taiwanese"
The former emerged as a reaction against an authoritarian era under which local culture and consciousness were suppressed. It therefore has a "Taiwan-centric" core that strives for the "equality and independence" of Taiwan. It emphasizes the traditional and local Taiwanese cultural heritage, and therefore has an idealistic nature.
"Status quo" consciousness is a response to the emergence of "native Taiwan." It stresses the importance of "Taiwan first," as well as maintaining the status quo and keeping up economic development. It is based on middle-class and metropolitan values. As it concentrates on current interests and future prospects, it incorporates some very pragmatic viewpoints.
After the process of democratization got underway, the political figures and the circumstances of the time dictated a switch in the theme of the "native Taiwanese." The shift was from an "anti-authoritarianism" to "anti-KMT." Later on, in the face of China's military threats and diplomatic isolation, the focus was switched again, to "stand up against China's hegemony."
Metropolitan residents and the middle-class spearheaded the emergence of the "status quo" consciousness. They are concerned about their quality of life and ensuring Taiwan's continued economic development -- and maintaining the status quo in cross-strait relations. Alhough a great number of people fall within this group, they are not easily mobilized.
Although differences do exist between these two "conscious-nesses," the two groups are not necessarily far apart in essence. "Native Taiwanese" consciousness" has apparently become the cornerstone of the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration, which is reworking the public policies and ideologies of the KMT era -- the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant and the "one China" principle being the most prominent examples.
While public policies entail constitutional issues and inter-party struggles, cross-strait ideological disputes involve a lot more. Cross-strait relations are closely related to regional security, as well as US and PRC interests and pressure.
"One China" is an especially unsettling problem. The Chen administration is under pressure because of its inability to get a firm grip on this issue. The pressure was ratcheted up by Academia Sinica president Lee Yuan-tseh (李遠哲) and Formosa Plastics Group chairman Wang Yung-ching (王永慶) with their open support for "one China, with each side making its own interpretation" (一中各表). Lee and Wang have made the "native Taiwanese" consciousness realize that we can no longer deal with cross-strait relations under the rigid premise that accepting the "one China" principle is tantamount to acknowledging defeat.
In fact, defining positions on the political spectrum by where one stands on independence or unification has become meaningless since the administration began moving toward the center on cross-strait policies. The terms "unification" and "independence" are now as ambiguous as "sovereignty," though recent events suggest that the debate over these two positions is still going strong. How to manage cross-strait relations is the crux of the debate.
Against a backdrop of an increasingly mature democracy and cross-strait economic inter-dependence, the two types of consciousness must reach a consensus on a new "three no's" policy for cross-strait relations: "no pro-China, no fear of China, and no anti-China." The word "China" in this context has multiple definitions -- depending on the issues in question -- including Chinese, the mainland, Chinese culture, PRC, Chinese Communists.
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