Taiwan's soon to be effected opening of the "small three links" between its outlying islands and China's coastal cities may turn out to be much ado about nothing.
It is ironic that the islands of Kinmen and Matsu after serving as Taiwan's frontline fortresses against its giant rival for five decades, have now become a jumping-off point for cross-strait interaction.
The "small three links" were not Taiwan's idea to begin with. During the Koo-Wang talks held in Singapore in 1993, Beijing proposed the opening of links between "the two Men's" (Kinmen and Xiamen) and "the two Ma's" (Matsu and Mawei). Taiwan rejected the proposal at the time, saying that direct links belonged to the "medium term" in cross-strait relations as outlined in its Guidelines for National Unification, and transition to that was dependent on completion of "near-term" goals such as renunciation of the use of military force by China -- goals which have not been achieved even now.
Seven years later, the situation has reversed. Taiwan wants to open the "small three links," but China is refusing to open negotiation channels unless Taiwan recognize its "one China" dictum.
In any case, the "small three links" are poised to get the two sides connected, even if in fits and starts.
Taiwan didn't even have a plan to open the "three small links" until the Legislative Yuan, almost unintentionally, passed a provision on cross-strait links in the Offshore Islands Development Bill
Beijing's refusal to negotiate with Taiwan, however, has minimized the significance of the move. Legalizing the rampant smuggling activities between the outlying islands and the Chinese coast and improving the supply of daily necessities for the islands' residents explain Taiwan's aim in opening the inks. Beyond these, the links also cover tourism, transportation, currency exchange and trade, but these areas will remain effectively closed until the two sides are able to meet face-to-face for talks and to work out the many practical details.
The "three small links" have become a new arena in the cross-strait tussle, as Taiwan uses them as a lever to push for cross-strait dialogue and Beijing uses them -- or rather their denial -- to gain leverage on "one China."
Under these circumstances, the significance of the new links will be little more than symbolic. In fact, the narrow-mindedness of Beijing's leadership has given Taiwan some breathing space. If China had generously opened its doors and been willing to resume a dialogue, Taiwan would have found it much more difficult to resist the "China fever" sweeping its populace -- and the pressure to open the full-fledged "three direct links" between Taiwan proper and China.
Thanks to Beijing's hardline refusal to negotiate, Taiwan can now control the pace of its policies and test the scope and feasibility of cross-strait exchanges. China's miscalculation has significantly reduced the political costs to Taiwan. Beijing's short-sighted rejection of a goodwill gesture has given the Taiwan government sorely-needed breathing space for tackling pressing domestic political issues.
The Taiwan government can put the blame squarely on Beijing for whatever failures occur with the "three small links." It will also be able to buy at least six months to prepare for the full "three direct links." A gradual opening of cross-strait links will have a less drastic impact on social order in Taiwan.
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