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Don't miss opportunity for reform this time

The leaders of the three-party opposition alliance proposed during their recent meeting that constitutional amendments should first "change the current presidential election system to an absolute majority system," and "resort to an election system that integrates political parties with mainstream popular opinion."

For the time being, let's set aside the question of whether Taiwan's future constitutional system should develop along the lines of the US presidential system or more clearly toward a semi-presidential system.

In the current political situation, many people are in favor of using a two-round, absolute majority voting system to elect the president in order to strengthen the president's popular mandate and to serve as a mechanism for concentrating public opinion.

But, in discussions of constitutional amendments, similar importance should also be attached to reforming the election system for the legislature, which acts as a check on executive authority. Otherwise, even if we elect a president that has a solid mandate, we could be destined to move toward a system of either strongman politics or political stalemate, given the present environment in the legislature. Thus, while discussing reforms to the system for electing the president, it is necessary that "complementary" reforms to the system for electing legislatures should also be considered. Otherwise, breaking free from the blind worship of executive power will be difficult.

A key part of the French Fifth Republic's 1958 constitutional reforms involved changing from a proportional representation system, used during legislative elections in the Fourth Republic, to a single-member district, two-round voting system. This was done in an effort to improve the growing problem in the Fourth Republic of presented by the existence of too many political parties. As far as presidential elections are concerned, a two-round absolute majority electoral system was eventually passed by public referendum in 1962.

In Taiwan, if the political parties agree to adopt a two-round, absolute majority system for only the presidential election and yet -- due to the consideration of vested interests -- maintain the current multi-member district and single non-transferrable vote system for legislative elections, then the chaos in the legislature is likely to persist, as is "black gold" politics. Party discipline will remain ineffective. With such a legislature, the operation of the Constitution will still deteriorate even if we have a president with a strong mandate.

More often than not, the choice of system has a major impact on the operation of the Constitution. Think about it. If we had adopted a US-style electoral college system during the second stage of our constitutional amendments, then what would have resulted from a situation like today's US presidential election, whereby one candidate -- despite having won more popular votes -- is defeated because he gets fewer National Assembly votes under a multi-member district system?

Similarly, if in future constitutional amendments we adopt an "integrative" two-round, absolute majority system for the presidential election on the one hand, and yet on the other hand adopt a "divisive" multi-member district, single non-transferrable vote system for legislative elections, what kind of party politics will emerge from the joint operation of these two electoral systems that are based on very different logic?

I hope that the politicians and political parties that control decision-making on Taiwan's constitutional reforms will think in terms of the big picture. Haven't we had enough bitter fruit from the past six rounds of constitutional amendments?

Wang Ye-lih is a professor in the politics department at Tunghai University.
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