Foreign policy issues have taken an unexpectedly prominent place in the upcoming US presidential elections. One disagreement made front-page news recently when a close advisor to Republican nominee George W. Bush proposed that America's European allies handle future Balkan-style peacekeeping missions while the US focuses on deterring large-scale aggression -- especially in East Asia and the Persian Gulf.
One issue that has not yet received much attention is how the results of the election may affect US policy toward China. The conventional wisdom, both in the US and East Asia, is that a victory by Vice President Al Gore would mean a continuation of the Clinton administration's policy while a victory by Governor Bush would lead to a more hardline policy toward Beijing and a more enthusiastic support for Taiwan. As is often the case, the conventional wisdom is wrong in crucial respects.
It is true that Bush has been highly critical of President Clinton's "three noes" statement in Shanghai and the administration's overall tendency to treat Beijing as a potential "strategic partner" of the US. In his first major foreign policy address more than a year ago, Bush stressed that China was a "strategic competitor," not a strategic partner.
Given that attitude, and the similar views of most Republicans in Congress, a Bush administration would distance itself from that aspect of Clinton's policy. The new administration would also almost certainly take a much harder line on Beijing's export of sensitive military technology to so-called rogue states. Nevertheless, those people in Taiwan and elsewhere in East Asia who predict a radical change in policy toward China under a Bush administration are likely to be surprised. Most of the governor's foreign policy advisors are pragmatists who held mid-level positions in his father's administration and are not about to embark on an ideological crusade against the PRC. Furthermore, the business community, whose highest priority is to maintain friendly relations with Beijing to sustain the growing trade and investment ties, has even more influence in the Republican party than it does in the Democratic party. A Bush administration would be extremely hesitant to take any action that might anger that crucial political constituency.
The probable result of such conflicting pressures and incentives would be to produce a policy that is just modestly different from the Clinton administration's approach. Talk of a US-PRC strategic partnership would disappear, sanctions against firms associated with the People's Liberation Army would be imposed more readily, and there would be clearer warnings to Beijing not to threaten Taiwan. On the other hand, those who expect the new administration to greatly increase arms sales to Taiwan are likely to be disappointed. Indeed, a Bush administration might well continue its predecessor's tendency to pressure Taipei to make concessions and be more receptive to negotiations about unification. Even the campaign for an East Asian theater missile defense program is likely to proceed cautiously -- unless the PRC engages in a new round of saber rattling.
Just as a Bush administration would probably be less hardline toward China -- and less supportive of Taiwan -- than is generally expected, policy under a Gore administration would likely be something more than a mere continuation of the Clinton approach.
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