Susan Shirk, former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Michel Oksenberg, a senior research fellow at Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center recently co-authored an article for the International Herald Tribune, introducing the concept of arms control into cross-strait relations. The most salient point in the article was the call for bilateral arms control talks between Beijing and Taipei.
Traditional US strategists have long regarded arms control as a patented right of the US and Russia, who are relatively on par with each other in terms of military might. The idea of arms control has rarely been applied to cross-strait relations, perhaps due to the gaping military imbalance between China and Taiwan. What is the significance of this suggestion from Oksenberg and Shirk, representatives of official and academic circles respectively? What impact will it have on the US' future China policy? These questions deserve in-depth analysis.
In February and May this year, I discussed with Shirk and Oksenberg individually the feasibility of applying the concept of arms control to cross-strait relations. The focus of both discussions was on using arms control as a methodology for gradually pushing for confidence building measures across the Taiwan Strait, thereby reducing the possibility of military conflict.
This creative approach is aimed at slowing the current arms race on each side of the Strait -- a race detrimental to military stability in the region. The only way to realize this objective is for the two sides jointly to create a "Taiwan Strait zero-missile zone."
During the discussions, Shirk said the US government was already considering arms control measures as a way of reducing military tension across the Strait. In fact, during his meeting with ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan (
In terms of impact, however, the proposal by Oksenberg and Shirk -- that China announce "a moratorium on the emplacement of additional missiles and missile launchers aimed at Taiwan" in exchange for a positive response from the Taipei authorities -- falls far short of a zero-missile zone.
At best, Oksenberg and Shirk are only hoping for a unilateral compromise from Beijing, like halting missile deployment, to win some kind of positive response from Taipei. In other words, China should "freeze" its military threats in order to win some kind of concession from Taiwan. This is typical American thinking. The weaker side, Taiwan, is not likely to accept this kind of arrangement, while the stronger, China, will keep upping the ante with its endless demands.
In comparison, the idea of the zero-missile zone is founded on the premise that China will withdraw its short and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles in exchange for the postponement of Taiwan's participation in the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. Here, Washington can play a detached and deft role as a mediator because the US government does not need to seek Beijing's approval for arms sales to Taiwan, nor is it obliged to fulfill every ambition of Taiwan.
For Taipei, the approach means getting something in the present tense in exchange for forgoing a future program. It is worth in-depth consideration by policy-makers.
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