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Editorial: Cross-strait policy needs a rudder

Premier Tang Fei (唐飛) announced that the "small three links (小三通)" will begin at the end of this year. The "small three links," despite much less significance and influence, tests the water for the "three direct links (三通)." Its outcome will directly impact the timing and manner of the "three direct links." Taiwan has considered the "three direct links" as a bargaining chip in cross-strait negotiations. No goodwill has been forthcoming from China, and as a result the government has had to open up the "small three links."

The "Regulation on Offshore Development (離島建設條例)" provides the legal basis for the "small three links." The Council of Mainland Affairs has, however, delayed implementation for technical reasons. Like it or not, unofficially the "small three links" have already become a reality. The government is simply decriminalizing and legalizing a common occurrence. If the government delays legalization any further, it may very well incur popular resentment.

With the upcoming WTO entry, direct commerce between Taiwan and China is inevitable. The pressure for direct links would immediately build upon entry. By opening up the "small three links" now, the government at least has control of the policy. It may rely on its experience with the "small three links" to plan for the "three direct links." This would be consistent with the government's "gradual and incremental" policy approach. If the government learns to address problems derived from the "three links" through international or quasi-international standards, then it will lose control of its China policy when the "three direct links" forces entry into the WTO.

China recently engaged in many offensives to isolate the government and tried to reach out to all corners of Taiwan society. It has received members of various political parties, held press conferences, and even agreed to Ma Yin-jeow's (馬英九) visit to Shanghai. China's vice president Qian Qi-chen (錢其琛) also said that "the issue of direct links is easy ... so long as both sides agree that ships do not hang (national) flags in harbors." It is truly impressive the way Qian handles a legal problem with political flexibility and soft posture. If Taiwan continues to handle the political issue in question through legal means, it will suffer in terms of international image and popular perception.

Chen's administration has always considered stabilizing the cross-strait relationship a top priority. Overseas, it tries to live up to the demands of the US. At home, it avoids agitating China in an attempt to resume cross-strait negotiation. Academia Sinica president Lee Yuan-tseh's (李遠哲) cross-party task force is intending to seek consensus, rather than make the actual landing. DPP chairman Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) tried to meddle in cross-strait affairs, but his trip to Xiamen was halted by President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Hsieh's comment about "not ruling out unification" was an attempt to gain a voice on cross-strait policy, but Hsieh withdrew due to Chen's displeasure. As Lee and Hsieh retreat, Chen, out of neccessity, stands on the frontline of the cross-strait relationship, directly facing the ballistic assaults from China. No longer following his "new middle path" and without Annette Lu (呂秀蓮), Lee, and Hsieh, Chen cannot share responsibilities in the cross-strait relationship.

Chen inherited Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) team and operational mode for cross-strait affairs. Without Lee's "special state-to-state" model as the core belief, Chen's cross-strait policy lacks a comprehensive blueprint. As a result, policy is formulated only after it has become a practical reality. The opening up of "small three links" is a neccessary result. However, at least the government still holds the steering wheel. The government should seek to have the ball in its court based on a forward-looking mode of thinking, rather than allowing practical circumstances to dictate the policy's direction.
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