Both the Republican and Democratic Parties have now produced their platforms for the coming elections. Since, in past elections, they have so often been ignored once the winner becomes president, they have not attracted much attention.
Although the parties' platforms on China and Taiwan are considerably different in tone, so were they in 1996. In that year, the Democrats applauded what had already been done (the Japan security agreement and the dispatch of carriers to the Taiwan Strait), and supported a "steady engagement" policy with China to encourage a "stable, secure, open and prosperous China." They had nothing to say about Taiwan.
The Republican platform that year supported liberty for the Chinese people, and posited a relationship based on "vigilance with regard to military potential." The rest concerned Taiwan: the Taiwan Relations Act, the commitment to Taiwan's security, that the US would regard any threat to alter its status a threat to America's security interests and make arms available, including the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) system and coastal submarines. It also supported a "larger role for Taiwan in international organizations." Both platforms were, as far as China and Taiwan were concerned, short (one paragraph).
This year, the Democratic platform's section on China and Taiwan is equally short (with one even shorter paragraph on the rest of East Asia). It promises to continue to engage China and to investigate ways to cooperate across a broad range of issues, while insisting on adherence to international standards on matters including "bellicose threats directed at Taiwan." This time it does note "responsibilities" under the Taiwan Relations Act. It remains committed to a "one-China" policy, and supports a resolution of cross-strait issues that is both "peaceful and consistent with the wishes of the people of Taiwan."
The Republicans had a longer section on East Asia. There was much more on Japan and our primary relationship with it. The China and Taiwan section, about twice as long as the Democratic one, was about equally divided between China and Taiwan. On China, it was called "America's key challenge," and was critical of its behavior. There were two sentences that best described their attitude toward China: "We will deal with China without ill will -- but also without illusions, [and] ... understand the importance of China but not place China at the center of [our] Asia policy."
On Taiwan, the platform said the US will "honor our promises" and that Taiwan "deserves our support including sale of defensive weapons ... deserves our support for membership in the WTO, WHO ... and other multilateral institutions." It acknowledges the view that there is one China. "All issues regarding Taiwan's future must be resolved peacefully and must be agreeable to the people of Taiwan." If China violates these principles, then the US will respond appropriately under the TRA.
How important are these platforms? They are not solid commitments, though they are written that way.
Still, to a large extent, it does represent a public commitment by the party the president heads. Some of the words in the Taiwan part of the platform, in fact, represent words that George W. Bush has used publicly in his campaign. He would have at least to explain to the public, and to his party, if he deviated from it.
In assessing the positions taken at this time by the two main political parties, one can see that both now subscribe to the need for the consent of the people of Taiwan to any change to Taiwan's political status. The Republican side continues to support a greater role for Taiwan in the international community, (the Democrats do not address this point), and it makes more clear its support for weapons sales and other means to help Taiwan to defend itself. The Republicans also use wording in the platform that suggests that they will not be overly sensitive to perceived PRC anger, as the Clinton Administration has been. But that remains to be seen.
It is significant and clear that neither party, at least publicly, is prepared to reassess its policies regarding China and Taiwan which the profound changes that have occurred over the last decade call for. Both, for example, subscribe to a "one-China" policy, and intentionally or not, both make that point in the Taiwan part of their platform, not in the China part where one would normally expect it.
Given the broad spectrum of ideology in both parties, writing a platform that can gain consensus is often a wrenching experience. The Democrats had the easier time of it, since they are the incumbent party and can hardly deviate far from the policies they have been pursuing. That was clearly the case as they enunciated their Taiwan policy. The Republicans, on the other hand, had to offer something different and had to do some re-drafting before gaining consensus. Hence the much tougher stand on Taiwan policy that emerged in the final paper.
For Taiwan there are more than the usual uncertainties about America's future policy. President Chen has invested a great deal in gaining support from the present US administration. That was a difficult objective -- especially if one recalls what it was like about a year ago -- and he has succeeded. Whether that will be sustainable is hard to predict. If, for example, the PRC decides to alter its approach to the cross-strait issue by a campaign of "smiling" rather than, or even in conjunction with, the threatening posture it has been using, attitudes could change. In addition to the influence this might have domestically in Taiwan, it could also change attitudes in Washington where, among many, it would be seen as a concession.
And in Washington, regardless of Beijing's actions, there will be a change in administration only four months from now. There could also be changes in the Congress as well. How much the platforms of the two parties actually tell us about their true intentions will only be revealed after that change.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.
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