It's been three months since the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration took power. The birth of his administration had a big impact both inside and outside Taiwan. Chen has tried to ease this impact by, first and foremost, advocating "a government for all the people," and appointing Tang Fei (唐飛), a former commander in chief of the air force and KMT member as premier, and appointing other KMT members to the Cabinet.
Second, Chen has demonstrated considerable goodwill to China by promising not to declare independence during his presidency, and to keep former president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) "special state-to-state" model for cross-strait relations out of the Constitution.
Although the above actions may be considered successes, the political efforts of the administration have sailed less plainly. The business community feels distrust towards the Cabinet because of its inconsistent statements on financial and economic policies. Relying on its majority in the Legislative Yuan, the KMT has rejected the pensions for the elderly bill promised earlier by Chen.
In addition, both the KMT and People First Party (PFP) have refused to participate in the cross-party task force established by Chen to seek a consensus on Taiwan's China policy.
The final blow to the administration came from the Pachang Creek incident at the end of July. In the aftermath of the tragedy, the fire department and the police blamed each other and Chen's popular support ratings dropped from 80 percent to 60.
I found a very peaceful and orderly social atmosphere in Taiwan during my visit in early August. It was certainly a sharp contrast from the unease detected between March and May.
This is partly due to the creation of "the government for all the people" as a crisis management step as well as the overall performance of the new administration. My earlier impressions may have been influenced by Taiwanese media, which has been critical and unfriendly toward the new administration.
Nevertheless, Taiwan's political landscape still appears to be gridlocked by institutional and structural barriers. Even though the legislature may reject bills introduced by the administration, the president is not constitutionally empowered to dissolve the legislature and hold early legislative elections -- a possible avenue to break the standoff -- unless the legislature first passes a vote of no-confidence against the premier.
The president may appoint and dismiss the premier without the legislature's approval. However, he cannot directly control Cabinet members even if he is dissatisfied with the premier and wished to bypass him. This institutional problem never came to light during Lee's presidency because his party, the KMT, had a majority in the legislature, and Lee himself served as KMT chairman.
The KMT is not obligated to support Tang Fei, as Chen appointed Tang without prior consultation with the KMT and declared that his administration was not a coalition government.
Because the KMT would inevitably lose its legislative majority if an election took place right now, the KMT is unlikely to call for a vote of no confidence in the immediate future. This means the present legislative gridlock can only be unlocked when the legislative election takes place in December next year.
China has candidly expressed hostility in the wake of Chen's election win on March 18.
On guard about a potentially explosive situation, the US has actively engaged in "preventive diplomacy." As a result, Chen shifted to a softer line, sparking criticism from hard-liners within the DPP. China, in return, also indicated that it will for now first "listen to (Chen's) talk and observe (Chen's) actions," thus cooling cross-strait tension. Some say Taiwan and China may restart talks this fall. China is unlikely to take any major action toward Taiwan, be it coercive or soft, however, as its Taiwan affairs office recently underwent a reshuffle.
China continues to pressure Chen for a return to "one China" as the basis of talks.
Chen has refused and feels that a compromise may be possible only if "a future one China" is deemed an acceptable issue for discussion. As Chen has already played all of his "goodwill" cards, he is probably unlikely to make further concessions to China.
As for the relationship with the US, Chen is confident about improving bilateral ties, which deteriorated during Lee's administration. This is being accomplished through Chen's cautious China policy, which has invited criticism from those who see him as pandering to the US.
In comparison, Taiwan-Japan relations seem more problematic. The problem is whether the two can engage in a "normal state-to-state " relationship.
Japan colonized Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. The so-called "Japanese-language speaking generation" who grew up during this era completely withdrew from the political front-line after Lee lost his presidency. The post-war generation has no sentimental affiliation toward Japan, which it regards as just another foreign country.
Lee cultivated a strong relationship with Japan by alluring many Japanese with his ability to communicate on a wide range of topics in fluent Japanese.
It would be wrong to expect the Chen administration to blindly tread the same path as Lee did concerning Taiwan-Japan relations. The DPP doesn't carry the same historical baggage that the KMT did, and the Japanese should not feel frustrated about a return to "real-world" ties.
In the real world, Japan and Taiwan do not maintain normal diplomatic relations. Only a private relationship in keeping with the 1972 Japan-China joint declaration is possible.
Unlike the US, Japan has not enacted domestic law to institutionalize its relationship with Taiwan.
DPP members in the past have expressed discontent with Japan in this regard. DPP members believed that, despite its strong presence -- which until the Asian financial crisis rivaled that of China -- Japan has hesitated to support Taiwan, fearing a troubled relationship with China.
Now the criticism is coming from those in charge of the administration. While the Japanese private sector shows general support for Taiwan's democratic achievement, the Japanese government continues with the caution engendered by the 1972 declaration, much to Taiwan's dissatisfaction.
With the advent of the new government, Japan-Taiwan relations cannot follow the previous model. A new sense of closeness must be cultivated through sensitive and mutual understanding. It is important to hold talks, not necessarily in Japanese, about ties, rationales, and interests. To accomplish this, Japan must begin with an open discussion about "what Taiwan means to Japan."
Masahiro Wakabayashi is a professor at the Division of Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo.
Translated by: Sayaka Yakushiji
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