Carefully handle 'track two' efforts

Since the election of Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), an added emphasis seems to have been placed on "track two" diplomacy as a means to address cross-strait difficulties. The most common actors in these meetings are US policy elites, former officials and academics shuttling back and forth between Taipei, Shanghai and Beijing, meeting with relevant government officials in each city. But there also are examples of unofficial parties from Taiwan following the same itinerary.

The early motivation for an increase in such activity was ignorance on all sides of the implications of Chen's victory for cross-strait relations and Sino-US relations. American elites were frightened by their own ignorance and biases on Taiwan issues, especially when dealing with the DPP and worried that Beijing might be on the verge of attack. Beijing clearly had backed itself into a corner and badly misread political developments in Taiwan. But more than this, the newly-elected President Chen seemed to feel the need to reassure Washington and Beijing about his intentions. Track two diplomacy was an open and immediately available channel through which to address all these concerns.

So far, the results of track two visits appear mostly positive. American elites and policymakers have learned a great deal more about Chen's goals and the realities of Taiwan politics, and have communicated the same to their counterparts in China. Beijing has not attacked, but has held out the threat of doing so unless Taipei accepts the vaunted "one China" principle.

Chen, for his part, has maintained a relatively consistent and conciliatory posture towards both Washington and Beijing.

Nevertheless, there are problems with the track two process. No one believes, at least no one publicly asserts, that track two diplomacy should take the place of "first track" or direct govern-ment-to-government talks. Yet the frequency and variety of track two missions risks creating a certain level of comfort with the system that may actually be a disincentive for Beijing to take the necessary step towards recognizing and dealing with the Taipei government. The reality may be that one or both don't really want to deal directly with each other right now.

The other, and more significant, problem is the way track two missions are used by those parties. Because of its troubled diplomatic status, Taipei more than Beijing should be wary of the agendas of the various groups engaged in track two efforts. It should be more careful about who the president meets and what is said in these meetings.

The president's time is a scarce resource that is cheapened by overexposure. There is a seemingly endless supply of US groups interested in playing the "one China" game on both sides of the Strait. Their biases and intentions should be identified before agreeing to meet. The president need not meet with all or, for that matter, with any of them. President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) certainly does not meet with all who travel to Beijing. The Mainland Affairs Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs should handle the bulk of these appointments in Taipei.

The Presidential Office staff needs to protect the president's policies and statements from being spun by his guests. Being aware of the agenda behind each delegation (every one has an agenda), is a first step. Being careful not to speak in ways that could be misconstrued as an endorsement of outside agendas is a good next step. And finally, since most groups speak to the media after their meeting, the Presidential Office should be prepared to release a brief statement summarizing his message to the group as soon as the meeting ends.