Since the election of Chen Shui-bian
The early motivation for an increase in such activity was ignorance on all sides of the implications of Chen's victory for cross-strait relations and Sino-US relations. American elites were frightened by their own ignorance and biases on Taiwan issues, especially when dealing with the DPP and worried that Beijing might be on the verge of attack. Beijing clearly had backed itself into a corner and badly misread political developments in Taiwan. But more than this, the newly-elected President Chen seemed to feel the need to reassure Washington and Beijing about his intentions. Track two diplomacy was an open and immediately available channel through which to address all these concerns.
So far, the results of track two visits appear mostly positive. American elites and policymakers have learned a great deal more about Chen's goals and the realities of Taiwan politics, and have communicated the same to their counterparts in China. Beijing has not attacked, but has held out the threat of doing so unless Taipei accepts the vaunted "one China" principle.
Chen, for his part, has maintained a relatively consistent and conciliatory posture towards both Washington and Beijing.
Nevertheless, there are problems with the track two process. No one believes, at least no one publicly asserts, that track two diplomacy should take the place of "first track" or direct govern-ment-to-government talks. Yet the frequency and variety of track two missions risks creating a certain level of comfort with the system that may actually be a disincentive for Beijing to take the necessary step towards recognizing and dealing with the Taipei government. The reality may be that one or both don't really want to deal directly with each other right now.
The other, and more significant, problem is the way track two missions are used by those parties. Because of its troubled diplomatic status, Taipei more than Beijing should be wary of the agendas of the various groups engaged in track two efforts. It should be more careful about who the president meets and what is said in these meetings.
The president's time is a scarce resource that is cheapened by overexposure. There is a seemingly endless supply of US groups interested in playing the "one China" game on both sides of the Strait. Their biases and intentions should be identified before agreeing to meet. The president need not meet with all or, for that matter, with any of them. President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) certainly does not meet with all who travel to Beijing. The Mainland Affairs Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs should handle the bulk of these appointments in Taipei.
The Presidential Office staff needs to protect the president's policies and statements from being spun by his guests. Being aware of the agenda behind each delegation (every one has an agenda), is a first step. Being careful not to speak in ways that could be misconstrued as an endorsement of outside agendas is a good next step. And finally, since most groups speak to the media after their meeting, the Presidential Office should be prepared to release a brief statement summarizing his message to the group as soon as the meeting ends.
I suggest the following guidelines to help ensure that the track two process advances, rather than hinders, Taiwan's interests:
Do not negotiate. Track two diplomacy is a useful way to carry messages, discuss ideas and encourage respect for the interests of each party. But the track two process has no authority to negotiate. Any useful agreement needs to be enforceable. Only governments can do that.
Do not announce new policy. To protect the president from having his words used against him in the media or other public debate, the president should refrain from announcing any new policy during track two meetings. This will help the administration explain its position in the event that competing interpretations emerge over the contents of a particular meeting.
Do not circumvent normal government functions. The track two process should never interfere with the normal functions of government. Neither should it be used to serve functions that the government is capable of doing itself. Cabinet officials must be involved in the policymaking process, not just the damage control process. It is up to the president to ensure that track two diplomacy does not disrupt consultation, decision-making, and implementation of government policy.
The controversy surrounding Chen's recent meeting with representatives of the Asia Foundation demonstrates the risks involved in an undisciplined approach to track two diplomacy. The president chose to make news in a meeting with foreigners, apparently leaving much of his government scrambling to contain the public fallout of the announcement after the fact. His interests would have been better served by having government consultations and MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen's
The track two process has a lot of potential benefits, if it is managed well. Track two meetings help educate academic and political elites in the US about the realities of Taiwan's political progress, economic modernization, and strategic vulnerability. Such meetings also help Taiwan expand its network of strategic relations with those who influence policy in Washington, including potential future policymakers. When done right, track two meetings should encourage greater respect for Taiwan's interests and produce an atmosphere conducive to resumption of track one talks. These are worthy objectives, but they require discipline and coordination from the top in order to succeed.
Stephen J. Yates is a senior policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation in Washington.
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