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Offshore tactics are out of bounds

President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has reiterated his military concept of "fully engaging the enemy outside Taiwan's territory," which he first revealed during the presidential election campaign. This has generated heated debate between the ruling and opposition parties here, frantic criticism from Beijing, and worries in the US. It has also forced Taiwan's top military brass to smooth things over.

The idea of offshore engagement, first formulated by the policy committee at DPP headquarters, is to keep any military conflict outside Taiwan proper. It is a well-intentioned but impossible strategy. In a high-tech war, offshore engagement only allows the stronger power to pounce at the smaller one. A small country cannot afford to provoke its larger adversary in such a way.

Those in the DPP who formulated the strategy also admitted that they learned the idea from their nemesis across the Strait. The PLA's National Defense University came up with the concept of an "all-out deep strike and quick response" when it proposed guiding principles for a regional high-tech war eight years ago. The priorities in the PLA's offshore engagement plan are to: 1) paralyze military command centers; 2) destroy fuel and power facilities; 3) cut off transportation to the outside world;

4) shatter public morale; and 5) crush the main combat forces.

Given the demand for "minimum damage, high efficiency, rapid attack and swift ending," the very first surprise attack from China will be the end game. There will only be one strike, not two. China's strategy is based on forcing Taiwan to surrender shortly after the initial strike begins, thus ending the war at the negotiation table and avoiding US military intervention.

I do not know whether China can accomplish these objectives. The DPP's call on the Taiwan military to "project its firepower and launch a deep strike," however, can be compared to a moth flying into a flame.

Strictly speaking, only a superpower -- the US -- can afford a decisive engagement outside its territory. We only have to look at the reconnaissance missions by China's warplanes over the past year (where radar information is still manually relayed) to understand that China cannot possibly accomplish its "deep strike, quick response" concept. The PLA has admitted that it faces serious challenges -- "three highs" (high speed, high difficulty, high attrition) and "three difficulties" (defense, command and logistics) -- in a regional high-tech war against Taiwan.

China may, however, become the dominant military power in the Asia Pacific 10 years from now, given her military buildup. By then, she may be capable of minimizing casualties and limiting them to military personnel, as well as accomplishing "minimum damage, high efficiency, rapid strike, swift ending" in a war against Taiwan.

Since China's 1996 missile tests, Taiwan's second-generation combat forces have successively entered service, but plans for third-generation forces are not drawn up yet. In comparison, China's military buildup is tilting the balance in Beijing's favor, both in quality and quantity.

I would like to ask whether the Taiwan military has the capability to engage the enemy outside Taiwan's territory or to stop the enemy on the other side of the Strait. Even if it does, how many "decisive battles" can it fight by projecting firepower? What is the guiding principle of the DPP's policy? Is it to let the valiant Taiwanese populace experience some sort of pleasure from a deep strike? Or to endure the suffering of continued assaults from the other side in a vicious cycle of retaliations? Before marching off to war, the DPP would do well to understand the PLA's thinking on absolute revenge.

The most urgent task in improving Taiwan's military preparedness is not buying or developing weapons to destroy the Three Gorges Dam or Luqiao military airbase in Zhejiang. Rather, the strategic priority is to build a complete civil and psychological defense system to maintain public morale during a war.

When it comes to national defense, some things can be both said and done (setting up air and sea superiority and anti-amphibious landing policies). Some can only be said but not done (calling for nuclear weapons programs). Still others can only be done but not said (building information warfare capabilities). The idea of offshore engagement is none of these. It can neither be said nor done. I hope the new government and the military will hearken to their consciences and professionalism and speak less of offshore engagement.

Logically, there is only one way to prevent a war from spreading to Taiwan: prevent its outbreak in the first place.

Chung Chien is a professor in the department of nuclear science, National Tsinghua University.
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