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Editorial: Secret talks, invisible groundwork

In the early 1990s, thanks to the efforts of historian Nan Huai-chin (南懷瑾), emissaries from Taiwan and China met secretly in Hong Kong. Representing Taipei were Su Chih-cheng (蘇志誠) and Cheng Su-ming (鄭淑敏). On the Chinese side were Zeng Qinghong (曾慶紅) and Wang Daohan (汪道涵). Reports of these secret meetings have surfaced before but were always denied by the people involved. Now that some of those involved have finally admitted the meetings took place, people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will finally have a chance to learn the details.

That such secret meetings occurred should come as no surprise. In the early 1990s there were changes in the core leadership on both sides. The new leaders knew little about one other and wanted to understand each other's position. So it is not difficult to understand why they sent feelers out toward each other.

At the time, Beijing had considerable expectations about Lee Teng-hui (李登輝). So it approached Nan, who knew the top leaders on both sides and asked him to act as a mediator. This was at a time when sparks were beginning to fly in the KMT between Lee's mainstream group and the non-mainstream old guard. Reluctant to fight on two fronts, Lee sent his confidante Su to talk with the Chinese delegates, in a bid to prevent further deterioration of cross-strait relations.

Even though no major breakthrough was made at the Hong Kong meetings, the sessions obviously helped reduce hostilities and build an initial consensus, paving the way for the Kinmen agreement and later, the Koo-Wang talks.

Taiwan authorities need to understand what policy-makers in Beijing are thinking. A lack of secret channels can mean considerable danger for a country. This kind of communication cannot rely on official channels, which are constrained by public positions. Therefore, second and third tracks of communication will continue to exist alongside official contacts. This kind of work cannot be fully transparent because once the channels are publicized, no one will be able to say anything apart from parroting their official lines.

Given that their political stance is anathema to Beijing in the first place, Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) government and the DPP will find it more difficult to build secret channels than it was for Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) and Lee. It will be difficult for them to win Beijing's trust. However, the other side also lacks bridge builders and mediators to sound out Taiwan's new leadership.

Shortly after Chen's election, it was rumored that Jeremy Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists, and Shen Chun-shan (沈君山), former president of the National Tsing Hua University, were acting as secret envoys for Taiwan to Beijing. But these rumors were never confirmed. Building private contacts across the Strait at a time when distrust and anxiety are the dominant feelings on both sides will be a major challenge for the new government.

Most peace talks around the world have been heralded by ice-breaking contacts between secret negotiators, who shuttle back and forth until the negotiations are able to move into the official realm. The Arab-Israeli talks of the early 1990s were made possible by secret talks in Oslo. Last month's Korean summit was also preceded by secret meetings held out of view of prying Korean, US and Japanese eyes.

Of course, it is always possible for secret emissaries to sell out the country they represent. No matter how such meetings are arranged and held, in the end the results must be monitored and vetted by both the executive and legislative branches of the respective governments.

But given Taiwan's current situation, where an opposition party wields more power than the ruling party, it will be impossible for any negotiator to evade the opposition and public monitoring and sell out Taiwan's national interests.
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