A great lesson has been learned from Taiwan's first-ever change in ruling party from the KMT to the DPP -- the President can no longer rely on an authoritarian regime to execute his own will in policy implementation.
Under the KMT's authoritarian rule, the president himself was also the party's chairman. As the national leader, he could easily execute his or the party's decision without giving too much consideration to public opinion. Therefore, the new era of a "divided government" in which the president and the legislature belong to different parties has arrived. This "divided government" constitutes a challenge for Taiwan in the new century.
The most recent tension between the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan perfectly illustrates the new uncertainty accompanied by the rotation of ruling party. Additionally, President Chen Shui-bian (
Facing this brand new political set up, the new president must incorporate both the strategy of "going public" and his "power to bargain" in implementing his policies.
Since being sworn into office, President Chen's approval rating has surged nearly two-fold, reaching close to 80 percent, during the ensuing honeymoon period of his term. His patience in dealing with China as well as refined political skills in garnering support from the conservatives significantly contributed to this success. Nevertheless, as the honeymoon ends, the real challenge is just beginning.
Chen made good utility of his own popularity in his initial efforts to handle outside challenges. During a tour of the island to garner more grassroots support, Chen took the opportunity to unveil his idea on how to realize his "contracts with Taiwanese."
From the surface, Chen's visits to the rural and remote regions was no different from what his predecessors did in the old days. But if we examine it from a strategic perspective, it has been an effective way to build his own popularity as well as to generate public support. James Soong (宋楚瑜) garnered many benefits from such a strategy when he was provincial governor.
Policies can "go public" in a variety of ways. It is most conspicuous during formal, often ceremonial occasions, such as an inauguration or a press conference.
It can also take place in more casual occasions such as inspections and general public appearances -- all of which take place in public view and therefore can be highly visible.
The irony is that going public by itself won't help Chen successfully resolve the confrontation between the new administration and the Legislative Yuan. Chen must also rely heavily on his "power to bargain" to win support from the legislature. To do this, it is essential for Chen to develop multiple mechanisms to coordinate policy implementation with the Cabinet and persuade the legislature to accept his policy proposals.
If going public is to succeed as a leadership strategy, Chen must be able to successfully appeal and persuade. In theory, if the collective demonstration of support for the president's policy proposals impresses politicians, the support of a large number of citizens is needed. Legislators will then strategically align their position on the policy with that of the president.
However, the strategy of "going public" runs into difficulties in practice. Since Western-style lobbying techniques are not well-established in Taiwan, few opportunities exist for the president to influence the legislative process through public pressure.
As the new Cabinet is essentially a product of a cross-party alliance, the "power to bargain" becomes imperative for the new president to pitch his proposals.
The president can use press coverage in a variety of ways to improve his bargaining position. He may selectively release information that enhances his position and diminishes the position of his opponents. By assuming a firm public posture on a certain issue, he can establish a stance that everyone recognizes will not be easily abandoned.
Most importantly, the president should build appropriate mechanisms between the Presidential Office, the Cabinet and the Legislative Yuan to coordinate policy-making and policy implementation. Since the Constitution prescribes a semi-presidential system, it creates a situation where a popularly elected president has the power to nominate the premier, but lacks the authority to dissolve the Legislative Yuan.
As a minority president, Chen chose a KMT premier to lead the new Cabinet. Therefore, he must be very cautious in working with the new team, while at the same time making sure his "contracts" are being fulfilled. The president must also skillfully help the executive branch in its dealing with the legislature without creating an overbearing image.
The joint efforts of the president and the Mainland Affairs Councils (MAC) in dealing with a group of Matsu (
Since the incident led to discussions about the opening of the "small three links," some legislators of opposition parties took advantage of this opportunity to challenge the new government's cross-strait policy. After a careful and timely consultation, the MAC decided that it would take six months to evaluate the feasibility of the "small three links."
On June 21, Chen met with Yen Ching-piao (
During the meeting, Chen emphasized the need to put national security above individual interests. China rejected the Taiwanese pilgrim's planned trip the next day.
The decision-making process of this incident demonstrated the value of presidential bargaining and persuasion. It further proved that "going public" and the "power to bargain" are both beneficial.
For the remainder of his term, Chen will definitely witness further serious confrontations between his administration and the Legislative Yuan. Besides worrying about how to realize his all-encompassing but hard to achieve campaign promises, Chen must make tremendous efforts to find a balance between consolidating his own popularity, and winning congressional support through negotiation and persuasion. The strategy of "going public" and using his "presidential bargaining power," therefore, should be applied to complement to each other.
Liu Kuan-teh is a political commentator based in Taipei.
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