The Future
When it comes to the changes in Sino-US relations and its impact on the US-Taiwan relations and cross-strait relations, two differing approaches have long been dominant at the decision-making level. First, some moderate strains in Sino-US relations may offer opportunities to improve US-Taiwan relations and cross-strait relations.
Ironically, major strains in Sino-US relations will place increasing and perhaps unrealistic US expectations on Taipei's responsibility to engage in meaningful and constructive cross-strait relations -- particularly if Taiwan emerges as a major issue in the Sino-US relationship. This could result in US pressure, direct or indirect, on Beijing and Taipei to make progress in resolving their differences, without giving careful consideration of the extent to which the atmosphere for cross-strait rapprochement is mature.
The push over the last two years by some US China experts for a possible 50-year "interim agreement" between Taipei and Beijing overlooks the internal difficulties for both sides of the Strait to sign such an agreement at this time.
In the face of both challenges and opportunities accompanied by the ups and downs of Sino-US relations, Taipei must be very careful to decide where opportunities may exist but without getting caught in-between. The fact that no one in the US wants a confrontation with China over Taiwan, particularly if such can be avoided or if such appears to have been unnecessarily provoked, deserves special attention from Taiwan's new leaders.
For the US, its upcoming presidential election will not have a major impact on its China policy because the policy toward Taipei and Beijing is based on longstanding national interests. Nevertheless, some marginal adjustments are expected for the new administration (whether it is Bush or Gore) to adjust to the real politics of this triangular relationship.
Given that both Taipei and Beijing have failed to reach a consensus on the definition of the "one China" principle right now, cross-straits relations will experience a period of "wait and see" for a while. It will also take some time for the new US administration to get a clearer picture of its China policy.
It is better, therefore, for the US to adjust the "three pillars" its policy to place the "peaceful resolution" of Taiwan and China's differences ahead of the "promotion of cross-strait talks" and the Washington's acceptance of Beijing's "one China" policy. More importantly, the US should continue to encourage Beijing leaders to respect the will and free choice of Taiwanese people and let the future cross-strait relation open for public decision.
China will enter a leadership transition period by 2002, bringing another challenge for this emerging great power. Whether China will become a benign hegemony or a "loose cannon" will determine the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. It is , therefore, only with greater wisdom, creativity and patience that a constructive relationship between Taipei, Beijing and Washington will be maintained.
Kuan-teh Liu (



