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The changing of US policy toward cross-strait relations

By Kuan-teh Liu

Friday, Jun 09, 2000, Page 13

Ironically, major strains in Sino-US relations will place increasing and perhaps unrealistic US expectations on Taipei's responsibility to engage in meaningful and constructive cross-strait relations -- particularly if Taiwan emerges as a major issue in the Sino-US relationship.

The "Chen-Shiu-bian (陳水扁) era," characterized by a more pragmatic and benign approach to handling cross-strait relations, deserves consistent support and encouragement from the international community led by the US. "Voluntarism" and "reciprocity" are two key principles which the US can introduce into future cross-strait dialogue.

The Facts

After skillfully working with the new leader in Taiwan in tackling the cross-strait stalemate, Raymond Burghardt, director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), elaborated a new US policy orientation toward Taiwan and China on May 29 by emphasizing the need for the Beijing leadership "to take greater consideration of the Taiwan public that has become a key element in the cross-strait element in the cross-strait equation."

Asked about his view on the possibility of opening a new round of high-level cross-strait talks this autumn, Burghardt stressed that the US will support any arrangement that is "voluntarily" agreed to by both sides of the Strait. For both Taipei and Beijing to engage in a constructive dialogue, the US said "positive actions should be reciprocated with positive action." In other words, "voluntarism" and "reciprocity" are two new and key principles being used by the US for future dialogue.

Burghardt has reportedly met with Chen on several occasions since the March 18 election. The intensive interaction between AIT and the new president led to speculation that the US was actively involved in the drafting of Chen's inauguration speech. The controversy over whether the US should play a "mediator"or a "facilitator" role in cross-strait dialogue has also generated great debate.

That is why Burghardt's latest statements deserve special attention. While it represents a delicate new description of the US policy toward cross-strait affairs, it is also a reflection of the continuation of US President Bill Clinton's consistent statements over the last several months regarding "any ultimate resolution to the cross-strait dispute must require the assent of the people of Taiwan."

Burghardt's new statements also coincided with the hotline call made by China's president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) to Clinton on May 27. Chiang reportedly expressed his deep appreciation for the US House of Representatives' passage of the permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) bill and reassured Clinton that China had no intention of threatening Taiwan.

Whether Washington and Beijing have exchanged views over the most recent developments across the Taiwan Strait remained unknown. However, the events mentioned above reveal the inherent changes in the triangular relationships between the US, China and Taiwan.

The Debates

That the ties between two sides of the Strait should be "special state-to-state" in nature, as outlined by former President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) last July, furthered a new round of debate on the US policy toward Taiwan and China. Lee's announcement surprised the Clinton administration, which has been working very hard to establish a "constructive and strategic partnership relationship" with Beijing. It also brought new tension and uncertainties to cross-strait interactions.

The new element in cross-strait relations also introduced a wave of re-examinations of the US policy toward Taiwan. At issue is whether current US policy toward Taiwan -- embedded in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the three Washington-Beijing joint communiques and no-tably the "three no's" announcement made by Clinton in 1998 -- is able to handle the current situation -- where China is on its way to regional hegemony and Taiwan's democratization has created a greater need for the world to respect the will of the people of Taiwan.

Since a potential new approach failed to garner sufficient theoretical evidence to convince the administration, the existing policy framework represented by the three communiques and the TRA is still prevailing. Nevertheless, the administration faced another testing moment when Taiwan's presidential election turned into a tight three-way race. When the chances of a DPP candidate winning increased, the US found it had no choice but to deal face to face with Chen. And this constitutes the source of a possible Chen-AIT affinity.

Despite Chen's sudden about-face after his election victory of his stance on the independence issue, his pre-inauguration pledge that "the US would be satisfied with his inaugural address" did create some discussion about AIT's influence over him at that time. The argument might be exaggerated, however, it demonstrated a smooth channel of communication has been built between the US and the new government.

The Changes

Although the major part of his inaugural speech centered on domestic agenda, Chen's big "five no's" announcement concerning cross-strait relations was considered a major breakthrough in US-Taiwan relations as well. It alleviates to a great extent Washington's worry that a reckless DPP president might undermine cross-strait stability by unilaterally pursing de jure independence. It further reduces the possibility that the new leader in Taiwan would be "unpredictable" [at least for a short term] to the US.

Compared to Lee's "special state-to-state" scenario, Chen's "five no's" description has largely been welcomed by the international community because of his promise that as long as the Chinese Communist Party regime has no intention of using military force against Taiwan he would not declare independence, change the nation's name, push for "state-to-state" to be included in the Constitution or promote a referendum on independence.

Chen successfully offered an olive branch to Beijing government as well as the world, that the new government in Taiwan would not be a "troublemaker," a perception held by many over the past decade. The announcement was also justifiable because China has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan, which accomplished a major democratic achievement on May 20 with its peaceful transfer of power.

Judging by the recent developments in the Taiwan Strait area, it is natural for the US to adjust its original policy toward Taiwan and China. Despite reaffirming the three pillars of the US policy toward cross-strait relations, namely, support for the "one China" principle; abiding by the TRA and three joint communiques, a peaceful solution to cross-strait disputes and the resumption of cross-strait dialogue to resolve mutual differences, the Clinton administration has laid out a fourth pillar -- the consent of the people of Taiwan.

This was specifically articulated by Clinton to underscore the reality of democratic outcome in Taiwan. More importantly, Chen's statements largely reduced the possibility of US and Taiwan policy differences based on public opinion in Taiwan and built up mutual confidence between Washington and Taipei for further cooperation.

The Future

When it comes to the changes in Sino-US relations and its impact on the US-Taiwan relations and cross-strait relations, two differing approaches have long been dominant at the decision-making level. First, some moderate strains in Sino-US relations may offer opportunities to improve US-Taiwan relations and cross-strait relations.

Ironically, major strains in Sino-US relations will place increasing and perhaps unrealistic US expectations on Taipei's responsibility to engage in meaningful and constructive cross-strait relations -- particularly if Taiwan emerges as a major issue in the Sino-US relationship. This could result in US pressure, direct or indirect, on Beijing and Taipei to make progress in resolving their differences, without giving careful consideration of the extent to which the atmosphere for cross-strait rapprochement is mature.

The push over the last two years by some US China experts for a possible 50-year "interim agreement" between Taipei and Beijing overlooks the internal difficulties for both sides of the Strait to sign such an agreement at this time.

In the face of both challenges and opportunities accompanied by the ups and downs of Sino-US relations, Taipei must be very careful to decide where opportunities may exist but without getting caught in-between. The fact that no one in the US wants a confrontation with China over Taiwan, particularly if such can be avoided or if such appears to have been unnecessarily provoked, deserves special attention from Taiwan's new leaders.

For the US, its upcoming presidential election will not have a major impact on its China policy because the policy toward Taipei and Beijing is based on longstanding national interests. Nevertheless, some marginal adjustments are expected for the new administration (whether it is Bush or Gore) to adjust to the real politics of this triangular relationship.

Given that both Taipei and Beijing have failed to reach a consensus on the definition of the "one China" principle right now, cross-straits relations will experience a period of "wait and see" for a while. It will also take some time for the new US administration to get a clearer picture of its China policy.

It is better, therefore, for the US to adjust the "three pillars" its policy to place the "peaceful resolution" of Taiwan and China's differences ahead of the "promotion of cross-strait talks" and the Washington's acceptance of Beijing's "one China" policy. More importantly, the US should continue to encourage Beijing leaders to respect the will and free choice of Taiwanese people and let the future cross-strait relation open for public decision.

China will enter a leadership transition period by 2002, bringing another challenge for this emerging great power. Whether China will become a benign hegemony or a "loose cannon" will determine the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. It is , therefore, only with greater wisdom, creativity and patience that a constructive relationship between Taipei, Beijing and Washington will be maintained.

Kuan-teh Liu (劉冠德) is a political commentator based in Taipei.
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