There has been considerable expectation, in both the US and Taiwan, that once both sides of the cross-strait relationship become members of the WTO, there would be another platform for more contact and dialogue between the two. This could become the case, of course, and this result would indeed be very welcome internationally. One cannot avoid the possibility, however, that WTO could also become a new battleground between the two sides.
In the future, should the issue of publicly encouraging a boycott of certain Taiwan firms in the PRC be brought to the WTO by Taiwan, what would the result be? Recent experience with disputes put before the WTO seems to indicate the answer is -- not much. Not much substan-tively, that is, but recently a trade dispute did cause bad feelings between strong political allies. The EU refused to accept the results of a US complaint and the US retaliated with restrictions.
Taiwan will still have much to gain by joining the WTO, however. It will have access to the international community in a way and to a degree that it does not now have. The WTO will also be an option whenever the two sides of the Strait decide the organization is a desirable venue to discuss specific issues.
These are important enough considerations worthy of the membership on that basis alone. But one must also remember that the PRC, with its membership, will also gain a platform for political maneuvering. Expectations that membership by the two sides will generate a broad dialogue are too optimistic. That will take place only when the political will on both sides want it to happen, and that can happen with or without WTO.
If there was any expectation, in the US or elsewhere, that PRC intimidation by boycott or embargo would be a problem that could be addressed by the international community through WTO, that does not seem likely. It will continue to be through the same uncertain, unstructured, ambiguous means cross-strait issues have been addressed by all parties over the last 20 some years.
Nat Bellocchi (



