In the days leading up to President Chen Shui-bian's
But China's leaders have apparently liked enough of what they have heard and seen from Chen to consider how to coexist and cooperate with him. They have offered to resume cross-strait negotiations, still conditioned on the "one China" principle, but may be willing to accept an ambiguous definition of the concept. How Chen will respond to this new, more conciliatory line from Beijing will be an early test for his new administration.
Chen's inaugural address was a wonderfully designed and executed beginning to his administration, marking a new phase in Taiwan's democratic progress, and hopefully renewed progress in cross-straits relations. He laid out his domestic and international goals in broad strokes and explained the beliefs and values that motivated his goals. He set exactly the right tone for his presidency without detailing specific policy initiatives. In short, he said exactly what was needed to be said, and his speech received an appropriately warm response.
Reportedly, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) was actively involved in the preparation of the speech. Normally, this type of meddling would be cause for concern, but in this case it yielded a good result.
Almost immediately after Chen's speech ended, China began to soften its tone. China has welcomed Chen's offer to establish direct trade and transportation links with Taiwan and also offered to resume negotiations on a broader range of issues. Although China had earlier indicated that Chen had to explicitly endorse the "one China" principle in order to improve relations, it seems to be backing away from this extreme position.
Even before the speech, Tang Shubei
Shortly after Chen's inaugration, China officially said it was willing to resume negotiations if Taiwan abandons the "two state theory" and returns to the 1992 framework of a mutual commitment to "one China" while not insisting on a shared definition of the concept.
The first condition will be easy to meet, since Chen and other top officials have already said that they will stop using the "special state-to-state relationship" slogan, will not add it to the constitution, and will not abolish the National Unification Guidelines.
China's offer to return to the 1992 framework of "one China" but with different definitions of the concept is a significant development, since China had previously denied that there was such an understanding.
In fact, it was the belief of President Lee Teng-hui
If China is truly willing to use the 1992 framework as the basis for resuming talks, it reflects a degree of flexibility that most observers thought was unlikely. Being willing to live with ambiguity has always been a crucial element in improving cross-strait relations, perhaps now more than ever.
China's new offer is closer to Chen's willingness to talk about "one China" without accepting it as a precondition. There may be enough common ground here to resume talks, but how far those talks can go may turn on a deceptively simple question. Is Taiwan willing to renew its commitment to "one China" regardless of its definition?
If Chen is willing to talk about the concept, he had better be prepared to accept some version of it, whether the 1992 framework or some other formulation. Otherwise, any talks will likely end with hard feelings and a sense of betrayal. Numerous spokesmen in China have already questioned Chen's sincerity on the cross-straits issue. How Chen will respond to Beijing's offer will help answer their question.
It was therefore surprising that the new chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council was quoted last week as saying that Taiwan should not return to the 1992 framework, but instead that it was time to move on. The timing of this statement was quite odd. Just as Beijing was beginning to signal its more flexible intentions and its willingness to return to the 1992 framework, a new official claimed that framework was now obsolete.
Many of Taiwan's government officials and policy analysts had been calling for Beijing to return to the 1992 framework ever since the "special state-to-state" controversy began. Was this recent statement a hint of where the Chen administration is going, or simply a new official making a comment that is not consistent with Chen's China policy?
During Chen's first week in office, other new officials found themselves in the embarrassing position of not knowing their own bureaucracy's policy record. Every administration deserves a honeymoon to get its affairs in order, especially in this case, where the new administration also represents the unprecedented transfer of presidential power from one political party to another.
Now that Chen has laid out the broad outline of his goals for his China policy in his inaugural address, he and his national security advisors will need to carefully fill in the details with consistent messages, even if they have to remain ambiguous on some of the important details. If they cannot always be clear, they must at least be consistent. Otherwise, improvements in cross-straits relations will be slow in coming.
Bruce Dickson is the director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at The George Washington University.
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