Many people have given President Chen Shui-bian (
1. Taiwan neither wishes to nor can afford to get into a war.
2. If Taiwan does not accept the "one China" principle, then a war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would become inevitable.
Illustration: By Yu Sha
Of course, the majority of Taiwanese would never accept the "one China" principle pitched by Beijing, and sincerely hope for a peaceful resolution to the cross-strait issue by avoiding the "one China" principle. However, if the consequence of remaining mute on the "one China" principle is war, what should we do? In other words, this article is an attempt to seek a way out that is most advantageous to the survival of Taiwanese in a scenario that is most disadvantageous to Taiwan.
China, of course, hopes to place Taiwan within the framework of Chinese sovereignty, although it does not actually exercise sovereignty over Taiwan. On the other hand, the government in Taiwan exercises actual sovereignty over Taiwan, but has been unable to receive international recognition of this sovereignty. The two sides' dispute over the "one China" principle has therefore become a standoff.
The "one China" principle is a concept borne of imagination steeped in sovereignty and nationalism. Beijing's "one China" principle is an integration of an absolute claim for sovereignty and "official nationalism." On the other hand, the "one China" principle that Taiwan may eventually be forced to accept would be an integration of "pooled sovereignty" and "creole nationalism."
As the dispute over the "one China" principle entails much antagonism between the nationalisms of both sides, the two sides' positions on the sovereignty issue becomes uncompromising. Whenever a decision maker becomes overwhelmed by nationalistic sentiment, conflict and war become unpredictable. To lower the possibility of armed conflict between the two sides, we should first lower antagonism between the nationalism of both sides. In other words, we should allow room for imagining both China's "official nationalism" and Taiwan's "creole nationalism."
To any artist, a piece of blank paper offers infinite possibilities. However, ever since the two sides of the Taiwan Strait reached a consensus in 1992, both have become tense, nervous, and perhaps overly emotional as a result of a series of misunderstandings, military exercises, and Taiwan's presidential elections. In the long run, these "antagonistic" moves and words not only prevent resolution of the sovereignty dispute between the two sides, but may stir up nationalistic confrontation.
The most urgent task is to find room for both sides to imagine what to draw in the remaining blank space on the paper. I therefore advocate a concept of "one China and temporarily no interpretation by either side (
China has long accepted the concept of "one China, no interpretation by either side temporarily." This is because a greater number of countries hold diplomatic ties with China. Therefore, China is actually in a much better position to define "one China." Taiwan advocates "one China, with each side free to make its own interpretation" (
After "the special state-to-state" model was announced, China realized to its horror that Taiwan's own interpretation of "one China" was actually a "special state-to-state" model. Therefore, China believes that Taiwan unilaterally breached the "1992 consensus."
On the other hand, Taiwan's definition of "one China" naturally challenged China's "official nationalism," and even the legitimacy of the Chinese administration. To resolve the potential crisis over the legitimacy of its rule, China no longer finds acceptable the concept of "one China, with each side free to make its own interpretation."
To avoid military conflict between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and escalation of antagonism between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism, Taiwan and China should define the concept of "one China, with no interpretation by either side temporarily" through "issue linkage and package deals" For example, to keep China and Taiwan from offering their own interpretations of "one China," the two sides may agree to freeze their offensives and defensives in diplomatic warfare. Once a diplomatic ceasefire takes place, room for imagining "one China" would once again exist. Taiwan would then be able to keep the diplomatic ties that it currently possesses and reinforce its unilateral legal sovereignty. At the same time, China would then be able to feel confident that Taiwan would not challenge its unilateral "legal sovereignty over Taiwan" in the international community.
However, why should China give up its monopoly over interpreting "one China?" The answer is that Taiwan would make corresponding compromises. Taiwan may consider temporarily halting its efforts to join the UN and other international organizations. At the same time, Taiwan may seek participation in international organizations in which the Chinese government is the sole representative of China, while compromising in terms of the name used in these organizations.
However, Taiwan's goodwill should not in any way jeopardize the long-term interests of the Taiwanese. A peaceful negotiation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is needed. Any Chinese verbal assaults and military threats, as well as Taiwanese moves and talks that appear pro-independence would provoke antagonism between the two sides. To leave more room for imagining "one China," the two sides should immediately push for an agreement comparable to the interim-agreement proposed by the US. While the agreement is still in force, Taiwan promises not to declare independence in exchange for China's promise not to use force against Taiwan.
Of course, China may believe that once it promises not to use force, Taiwan would surely declare independence. To lower China's anxiety, Taiwan and China may consider incorporating a blueprint for a divided sovereignty and rule of a divided country into their interim agreement. In fact, the two sides may even work on a plan for economic integration. We must realize that cross-strait economic integration and peaceful interaction are the raw materials both sides use to imagine possible solutions. If Beijing intends to march toward the direction of "one China," then cross-strait economic integration and peaceful interaction are necessary elements.
On the other hand, even if China successfully takes over Taiwan with force, the emotional ties of the two sides would be injured in the process. Once the two sides get into a war, the people of Taiwan would have no choice, except to imagine "independence." With this agreement, the governments of both sides would not be able to provide their respective interpretations for the "one China" principle. As a result, Beijing's "official nationalism" and Taiwan's "creole nationalism" would both enjoy ample space for imagining a peaceful solution.
David W. F. Huang (
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