In the US, the problems associated with Taiwan-China relations have been studied and restudied in microscopic detail, so far without any telling results. The frustrations are starting to show. One hears more often now than in the past about taking another look, or that maybe a new approach is needed.
There is sound reason to support this line of thinking. We have called the Taiwan Strait a potential "flashpoint" for some time. The US has a variety of security commitments in the area. If the "flashpoint" actually materializes, the US has a real problem, one that it clearly wants to avoid. So common sense would say that maybe the US should be more active in this matter. But not having the US get more deeply involved could also be soundly reasoned. Common sense works both ways.
Some of this desire to become more active has translated itself into what has come to be called "track 2." There doesn't seem to be any standard definition on just what "track 2" is supposed to mean. If it means that a group of non-governmental experts from the US, Taiwan and China get together periodically, discuss cross-strait issues, and send their findings to Taipei, Washington and Beijing, then the government involved can benefit from the report because the whole spectrum of the opinions of experts are taken into account. However, any actions based on it would be up to the government.
More recently there have been some efforts to encourage "involvement" by the US, not in resolving the issues of Taiwan's status, but in getting the dialogue between the two sides of the Strait restarted. That comes close to mediation. An initial report of a more direct effort to get the US involved came from the Washington Post, which claimed that both Beijing and Taipei were requesting this help. Predictably, both Beijing and Washington publicly opposed the idea. Beijing has always refused the idea under any circumstances. Their position that Taiwan is an "internal matter" would be undermined if a third country was allowed to intervene.
The US very quickly made it clear that it would not get involved. History is the reason often cited for this reluctance. The unfortunate experience of the Chinese civil war is getting old, but there are more current reasons for maintaining the position. The first carries the most weight -- having the US step into a mediation position would take the pressure off both sides to restart the dialogue.
But there are also current political reasons for the US to stay away from a mediating position. The current president has only about a half-year left in office. Doubtless he would like nothing better than to leave a successful legacy of his presidency. But in a half year, one couldn't reach agreement on the shape of the table much less actually beginning a dialogue. There would be no legacy, and the next president would certainly be very unhappy about being put in a position not of his choosing.
And finally, for the US, there is the risk. Supporters of the PRC in the US often cite the fact that that no leader in Beijing could "lose Taiwan" and stay in power. What is left unsaid is that no US president could "lose Taiwan" (or "lose China" again for that matter) and expect to stay in power past the next election.
One could also find reasons why Taiwan might be wary of such a US effort at mediating cross-strait dialogue. Since it would not involve substance, but would merely get the dialogue between the two sides restarted, it could rightly be called "facilitating," not mediating. But the function in many ways is already being done.
Taiwan might consider the disadvantages to this path. The US personnel that would be involved in "track 2" talks are almost entirely China experts. Taiwan experts are rare, and even more rarely invited. Ignorance makes objectivity more difficult. Neither Taipei nor Beijing would be able to choose the US participants, of course. In judgement, however, Taiwan would be at a disadvantage, willy-nilly, on this point alone.
But aside from personnel and prejudices on the US side, there is the very important matter of the US' "six assurances." Most of these assurance are connected to US arms sales to Taiwan, but one of them commits the US not to mediate between Taipei and Beijing. Another commits the US not to change its position on Taiwan's sovereignty (the US position is that Taiwan's sovereignty is yet to be determined). These assurances have remained intact since 1982. There are no laws or treaties or other rules that determine how any changes can be made. Changing one, therefore such as the US position on mediation, opens the risk that others could also be changed.
As all this demonstrates, the US-Taiwan relationship is not only bound by the Taiwan Relations Act, but also by a range of ambiguities and understandings that require careful thought by all countries involved before any actions are taken.
Nat Bellocchi was the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.
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