Cross-strait relations have remained tense since March 18. Most analysts believe the tension is due to Chen Shui-bian
The US first recognized "one China" during the Sino-US talks in 1972. It was a major compromise that failed to satisfy Beijing. In 1978, the US made another compromise by recognizing that "China" meant the People's Republic of China. Again, the move did not satisfy Beijing. In 1982, the US was once again pushed to agree to a gradual reduction of military sales to Taiwan, weakening Taiwan's military power.
As the US compromises began to tip the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region , the US had no choice but to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan in the 1990s. The sales made Beijing unhappy, as it worried that the US was backing down on its promises, resulting in Chinese military exercises in 1995 and 1996. Then the US made a fourth compromise with its new "three no's" policy.
Over the past 20 years, the strongest nation in the world has made four compromises to China as if it were a pawn in Beijing's palm. None of these compromises served to melt Chinese hostility, nor did they make the Taiwan Strait more peaceful. On the contrary, each compromise increased the possibility of conflict -- the last thing the US wants to see. Taiwan should learn from this lesson.
Take volleyball for example. You score points only when you serve. The best thing the other side can hope for is to force the server to lose the serve. If you do not win serve, you are bound to lose.
This is the situation Taiwan has put itself in today. China is unstable domestically and has yet to find a basic keynote policy to respond to Chen's new government and Taiwan's new political milieu. The Beijing authorities are in no position to volley, they can only serve threats. At this point, Taiwan is only thinking of returning every serve. Such a passive attitude has the following side effects:
1. Beijing can refute Taiwan's every response, creating pressure and internal division in Taiwan. Of course, Beijing knows Taiwan cannot possibly accept the "one China" policy. But Taiwan's way of responding to "one China" creates an advantage for the Chinese side to set the issues. Meanwhile, Taiwan will have to "listen to his words and watch his acts." China is framing Taiwan without using military force.
2. The long-term agenda for cross-strait relations should be a debate on equal footing, instead of China always playing the teacher setting questions for a quiz for Taiwan to answer. Now, the quiz sheet contains only one question: "one China." Taiwan racks its brain and yet doesn't see any goodwill on the Chinese side. It also runs the risk of running out of cards and getting weak-kneed. Once this image is set, it will have an extremely negative effect on Taiwan's relations with China.
3. Debates are now on the rise in the US over "one China," which might have passed during the Cold War as a measure that maintained peace and security. The Cold War is over and Taiwan has been democratized. "One China" is no longer compatible with reality and is even becoming a potentially dangerous factor in the region.
Today, all the pressures about the "one China" issue seems to have been caused by Beijing's worries about Chen's stance. In fact this pattern, whereby China is the only one dishing out all the questions, is a vicious cycle. If Taiwan does not take the initiative to jump out of this cycle, the trouble will never end.
Lin Cho-shui is a DPP legislator.
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