A normal relationship is inconsistent with attempts to isolate the PRC economically, much less adopt an overt containment policy. The latter approach would be especially unwise. A policy based on the assumption that China will inevitably become an aggressor and a mortal enemy of the US could easily create a tragic, self-fulfilling prophecy.
Embracing the goal of multipolarity, of course, would mean relinquishing America's own hegemony in East Asia. Washington would have to be content with a status of "first among equals" in the region, and that would entail some loss of control. But a hegemonic role is probably not sustainable over the long term in any case. It is a manifestation of national arrogance to think that the US can forever dominate a region that contains nearly a third of the world's population and that, despite a brief stumble, is becoming an increasingly sophisticated center of economic and technological output.
Only an unusual convergence of circumstances following World War II -- the eradication of Japan as a political and military player, China's exceptional weakness, and the final stages of decay in the various European colonial empires -- enabled the US to establish a hegemonic position in the first place and maintain it for more than a half century. It defies both logic and history to assume that hegemony can be maintained for another half century.
US leaders can adjust gracefully to the emergence of a more normal configuration of power in the region, or they can resist change to the bitter end. If they choose the former course, the US will be able to influence the nature of the new multipolar strategic environment in Asia and seek the maximum advantage for American interests. The US-PRC relationship would then be merely one component of a complex mosaic of relationships throughout the region, and there would be a significant opportunity for the US to pursue a policy that avoided the extremes of viewing the PRC as a strategic partner or a new enemy. The danger of a US-PRC military clash would substantially decline, and Washington would be able to develop a policy toward China that was prudent, sustainable, and beneficial to American interests.
If US leaders choose the course of stubborn resistance to change, the US will ultimately end up either in an armed struggle with the PRC for dominance in East Asia or be compelled to relinquish power to the region's new hegemon. The opportunity for the emergence of a relatively stable regional balance of power involving several major players will have been lost, and America's strategic and economic interests will be less rather than more secure.
Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and the author or editor of 10 books on international affairs.
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