An increasingly angry and divisive debate is taking place in the US about policy toward China. The Clinton administration as well as business-oriented elements within the Republican party advocate extensive "engagement" and seek ways to accommodate the Beijing regime. Those factions not only support China's membership in the WTO, they opposed Taiwan's request to purchase four Aegis destroyers and seek to block passage of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. Arrayed against them is an alliance of conservative Republicans and liberal human-rights activists who advocate a hard-line policy of "containment" toward the PRC.
Unfortunately, the debate is taking place in an inevitable fog of uncertainty about Beijing's intentions or likely behavior in the future. The root of the problem is that there is simply no way to know whether the PRC will be a peaceful, status quo power or an aggressively revisionist power. Significant factors push Beijing in both directions.
Precisely because of that uncertainty, the US must not lock itself into a strategy based on expectations of either friendship or an adversarial relationship with China. Instead, Washington should adopt a hedging strategy -- a set of principles that are likely to work reasonably well no matter what type of regime holds power in Beijing a decade or two from now -- or, equally important, what kind of great power the PRC turns out to be in terms of its international conduct.
Although China's extensive economic ties with its Asian neighbors (and with the US) are an important incentive for status quo behavior, there are other factors that produce incentives for aggressive revisionism. Most important, China is still nursing grievances about the humiliations and territorial amputations that occurred during its period of weakness in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century.
That is why the return of Hong Kong acquired an importance that transcended even the territory's considerable economic value; it was a symbol of China's restored national pride. The return of Macau is another step, but it is far from certain that China's leaders will consider the process complete unless Taiwan is absorbed and Beijing's territorial claims in the South China and East China seas are vindicated.
Some experts argue that the PRC does not harbor expansionist ambitions and wants to concentrate on internal economic progress. Even if that is true at the moment -- and Beijing's saber-rattling at Taiwan raises some doubts -- the existence of such an array of unresolved problems points to less pleasant possibilities.
Moreover, the history of international relations shows that rising great powers, especially those with territorial claims, typically pursue assertive, if not abrasive, policies. One need only recall the behavior of the US throughout the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century.
There is no way to know yet whether China will replicate such behavior, but it is unduly optimistic to assume that American and Chinese security interests are so compatible as to warrant a strategic partnership -- as the Clinton administration naively assumed in 1997 and 1998.
Moreover, if those policy experts and political leaders who contend that the interests of the two countries are likely to conflict are correct, choosing the PRC as a strategic partner would be an act of folly. Indeed, if the concerns about China's future strategic behavior have even the slightest merit, the US should be pursuing precisely the opposite course: creating an incentive structure for other regional powers or groups of powers to counterbalance the PRC.
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