An increasingly angry and divisive debate is taking place in the US about policy toward China. The Clinton administration as well as business-oriented elements within the Republican party advocate extensive "engagement" and seek ways to accommodate the Beijing regime. Those factions not only support China's membership in the WTO, they opposed Taiwan's request to purchase four Aegis destroyers and seek to block passage of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. Arrayed against them is an alliance of conservative Republicans and liberal human-rights activists who advocate a hard-line policy of "containment" toward the PRC.
Unfortunately, the debate is taking place in an inevitable fog of uncertainty about Beijing's intentions or likely behavior in the future. The root of the problem is that there is simply no way to know whether the PRC will be a peaceful, status quo power or an aggressively revisionist power. Significant factors push Beijing in both directions.
Precisely because of that uncertainty, the US must not lock itself into a strategy based on expectations of either friendship or an adversarial relationship with China. Instead, Washington should adopt a hedging strategy -- a set of principles that are likely to work reasonably well no matter what type of regime holds power in Beijing a decade or two from now -- or, equally important, what kind of great power the PRC turns out to be in terms of its international conduct.
Although China's extensive economic ties with its Asian neighbors (and with the US) are an important incentive for status quo behavior, there are other factors that produce incentives for aggressive revisionism. Most important, China is still nursing grievances about the humiliations and territorial amputations that occurred during its period of weakness in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century.
That is why the return of Hong Kong acquired an importance that transcended even the territory's considerable economic value; it was a symbol of China's restored national pride. The return of Macau is another step, but it is far from certain that China's leaders will consider the process complete unless Taiwan is absorbed and Beijing's territorial claims in the South China and East China seas are vindicated.
Some experts argue that the PRC does not harbor expansionist ambitions and wants to concentrate on internal economic progress. Even if that is true at the moment -- and Beijing's saber-rattling at Taiwan raises some doubts -- the existence of such an array of unresolved problems points to less pleasant possibilities.
Moreover, the history of international relations shows that rising great powers, especially those with territorial claims, typically pursue assertive, if not abrasive, policies. One need only recall the behavior of the US throughout the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century.
There is no way to know yet whether China will replicate such behavior, but it is unduly optimistic to assume that American and Chinese security interests are so compatible as to warrant a strategic partnership -- as the Clinton administration naively assumed in 1997 and 1998.
Moreover, if those policy experts and political leaders who contend that the interests of the two countries are likely to conflict are correct, choosing the PRC as a strategic partner would be an act of folly. Indeed, if the concerns about China's future strategic behavior have even the slightest merit, the US should be pursuing precisely the opposite course: creating an incentive structure for other regional powers or groups of powers to counterbalance the PRC.
UCLA political science professor Deepak Lal notes the potential arenas in which US and Chinese interests are likely to clash -- as well as Beijing's ongoing effort to increase the capabilities of its ballistic missile forces, which he concludes is aimed at building an effective deterrent against the US -- and argues that Washington's behavior toward India makes no strategic sense.
"If the strategic interests of China and the US are so clearly at odds, it would seem bizarre to penalize the one country in the region that might provide a strategic counterweight," he contends.
Even if one does not fully agree with Lal's assessment of Beijing's behavior, his observation about India's potential as a partial strategic counterweight has merit. Other analysts note that Japan could likewise play a counterbalancing role -- indeed Japan would probably be an even more important factor in Asia's strategic equation. Russia, Vietnam, Korea, a well-armed Taiwan and other powers would also likely be relevant players in the overall balance of power.
Although it is important for the US to avoid the extremes of containment or strategic partnership in its relations with China, it is even more important for the US to adjust its overall Asia policy. That requires new thinking, something that has not been in abundance among US policymakers.
The best course from the standpoint of American interests would be to encourage the emergence of multiple centers of power in Asia. The existence of several significant security actors would complicate the calculations of the PRC -- or any other power that might have expansionist ambitions. Otherwise, Washington is creating the blueprint for a brittle bipolar security environment in East and South Asia in which the only security actors that will matter a decade or two from now are the US and the PRC. The likely outcome would be either a war between China and the US or China's emergence as the new regional hegemon.
Encouraging the evolution of a multipolar strategic environment is not the same as adopting a provocative, US-led containment policy against China, however. Washington does not have to be the godfather of a vast anti-PRC alliance. If US officials stop smothering Japan and other allies in an effort to perpetuate their security dependence on the US, and refrain from berating India for wanting to be a first-class military power, China's neighbors will draw their own conclusions about Beijing's ongoing and probable behavior and adopt policies accordingly. Washington merely needs to get out of the way of that most normal of processes in the international system.
Encouraging -- or at least accepting -- the evolution of a balance of power designed to contain any PRC expansionist ambitions is also different from regarding China as an implacable foe of the US. Washington ought to treat China as simply another great power and cultivate a normal relationship, recognizing that the interests of the two countries will sometimes coincide and sometimes conflict. Cooperation needs to be fostered in the first case, and an effort to contain adverse effects must be made in the latter.
A normal relationship is inconsistent with attempts to isolate the PRC economically, much less adopt an overt containment policy. The latter approach would be especially unwise. A policy based on the assumption that China will inevitably become an aggressor and a mortal enemy of the US could easily create a tragic, self-fulfilling prophecy.
Embracing the goal of multipolarity, of course, would mean relinquishing America's own hegemony in East Asia. Washington would have to be content with a status of "first among equals" in the region, and that would entail some loss of control. But a hegemonic role is probably not sustainable over the long term in any case. It is a manifestation of national arrogance to think that the US can forever dominate a region that contains nearly a third of the world's population and that, despite a brief stumble, is becoming an increasingly sophisticated center of economic and technological output.
Only an unusual convergence of circumstances following World War II -- the eradication of Japan as a political and military player, China's exceptional weakness, and the final stages of decay in the various European colonial empires -- enabled the US to establish a hegemonic position in the first place and maintain it for more than a half century. It defies both logic and history to assume that hegemony can be maintained for another half century.
US leaders can adjust gracefully to the emergence of a more normal configuration of power in the region, or they can resist change to the bitter end. If they choose the former course, the US will be able to influence the nature of the new multipolar strategic environment in Asia and seek the maximum advantage for American interests. The US-PRC relationship would then be merely one component of a complex mosaic of relationships throughout the region, and there would be a significant opportunity for the US to pursue a policy that avoided the extremes of viewing the PRC as a strategic partner or a new enemy. The danger of a US-PRC military clash would substantially decline, and Washington would be able to develop a policy toward China that was prudent, sustainable, and beneficial to American interests.
If US leaders choose the course of stubborn resistance to change, the US will ultimately end up either in an armed struggle with the PRC for dominance in East Asia or be compelled to relinquish power to the region's new hegemon. The opportunity for the emergence of a relatively stable regional balance of power involving several major players will have been lost, and America's strategic and economic interests will be less rather than more secure.
Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and the author or editor of 10 books on international affairs.
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