It is a travesty that Taiwan's membership in the WTO is held hostage to China's. Everyone knows that Taiwan has been ready for WTO entry -- and to fulfil all its commitments therein as a developed country -- for years. China, by contrast, is nowhere near ready and may not be any time in the foreseeable future.
There is a school of optimism that holds that WTO membership will have a significant, positive effect on China. The argument goes that it will stimulate the development of the rule of law and good governance, and even democracy itself. This is sound in a very general, abstract sense. But, even if such an economic determinism is real, it will come about only gradually, and WTO membership may be only a secondary contributing factor. Thus the skeptics are right to insists that expectations not be inflated -- there is more than enough room for the possibility that this process will go awry.
What then ought we to feel about the upcoming vote in the US Congress to grant China permanent normal trading relations (PNTR)?
On the one hand, certain forces in Congress -- many of whom, we note, conspicuously proclaim their support for Taiwan's continued independence from China -- have found the annual most-favored nation (MFN) vote a convenient platform with which to strike out at China's manifold sins. Human rights issues of all stripes; from Tibet to prison labor, democratic reform, and yes, the threats against our country have all been noisily aired in these debates, which the passage of PNTR will eliminate. Even now, the vote on PNTR itself has been held up until after the inauguration of President-elect Chen Shui-bian (
On the economic side, however, the picture looks quite different. China's MFN status (which, we should remember, has never been revoked, for all the furor) is a commercial boon for Taiwan. It allows Taiwanese firms based in China, which are usually focused on the export market, to sell their products directly to the US under relatively favorable terms. This effect is not negligible, but is a substantial portion of China's billowing trade surplus with the US. Putting this state of affairs on a more stable footing would enable this trading relationship to further develop, bringing increased profits to Taiwanese businesses.
Thus the ambivalence in Taiwan to the PNTR vote is certainly understandable. But it must be always borne in mind that the PNTR is not a goal in itself, but only a step along the way of China's entry into the WTO. Whether or not we believe that WTO membership will have the revolutionary impact its boosters claim, it will certainly have one immediate impact: allowing Taiwan to enter. The somewhat qualified benefits PNTR itself brings to Taiwan pale before those of entry to the WTO.
Some have argued that the two elements should be separated. Although this could be theoretically possible, it would mean that the US would be in violation of a basic principle of the WTO charter from the moment China's entry took effect. Of course, if China then brought a complaint against the US and succeeded, it might establish a tremendous precedent for handling of the inevitable future complaints against China. Of course, if the US continued to resist, the whole structure of the WTO would be weakened, at great cost to global trade.
Thus, with reluctance, we support the passage of PNTR. There is no need to be hasty, however: As long as it doesn't delay China's -- and by extension our -- formal WTO entry, Congress can take its time.
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