First of all, the historical and international setting against which the Hong Kong consensus was reached has undergone significant changes. Among them, the announcement of the "three nos" by the US and other major powers, stated under pressure from the PRC, has given substance to the content of "one China" by defining "what `one China' is not." This has certainly hampered Taipei's ability to define "one China."
"One China with different interpretations" implies that neither side should oppose the other's definition of one China. However, with its existing international status and rising power, Beijing has the advantage of having its definition of "one China" be more frequently heard and more readily accepted. As a consequence of such comparative disadvantage, Taiwan's interpretation of "one China," no matter how clever, will eventually become nothing but murmuring.
In fact, China has relentlessly opposed Taiwan's right to define its international status. All the creative interpretations put forth by Taiwan (such as "one China, two regions," "one China, two administrations," "one divided China," etc.) are categorically rejected in the "one China principle" white paper. This has revealed the cruel fact that the so-called "one China with different interpretations" remains Taipei's wishful thinking.
In any event, it would serve both sides' interests to bypass any preconditions or principles and to initiate immediate positive dialogue and mutually beneficial exchanges. Nonetheless, even if coming back to the 1992 consensus is deemed a necessity, the content of that consensus must first beclarified. "One consensus with different interpretations" is no consensus at all and will never become a solid basis for resuming political negotiations. Worse, it could lead Taiwan into a very dangerous trap.
Lo Chih-cheng is an associate professor of political science at Soochow University.
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