Editorial: Eye on the brass hats

The rumbling and whispering surrounding the establishment of Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) Cabinet continues unabated, particularly in the absence of confirmation that Lee Yuan-tseh (李遠哲) will accept the premiership. Yet whether or not Lee accepts the job, one of the most difficult aspects of the power transition will be bringing the defense establishment clearly under the control of the new government.

One of the most unpleasant holdovers from the bad old days is the way in which the military is infused with KMT ideology -- the old kind of KMT ideology. In the early years of the Republic of China, the ROC army was officially the military arm of the KMT; in due course, the Communist Party mirrored it by establishing its own armed wing, the People's Liberation Army. Both forces styled themselves as revolutionary armies on the Soviet model. To this day, the ROC military retains its political commissar system, the Political Warfare Department.

Military training has always included political indoctrination. Starting during the Kaohsiung Incident trials in the early 1980s, the official theme of this program was "three enemies in one" (三合一敵人), which equated communism, Taiwan independence, and "separatism" (including such ideas as "state-to-state relations").

Ironically, many strongly pro-independence political figures, including DPP leaders, have historically been relatively supportive of the military, for example in terms of budget allocations and weapons purchases. They have done so out of a natural desire to keep Taiwan strong enough to resist China's pressure. In contrast, the New Party and its ilk have often argued for defense cuts.

It remains one of Lee Teng-hui's most notable accomplishments that we are not concerned about direct military interference in the working of the new government. A decade ago, this could by no means have been taken for granted. In order to ensure his own control over the armed forces, Lee did a lot of the heavy lifting in their nationalization. He slowly but steadily eroded the monopoly of mainlanders over the military command system. When current Chief of the General Staff Tang Yao-ming (湯曜明) assumed his post last February, every key position had been held at least once by native Taiwanese.

Nonetheless, there are still significant worries about how President Chen will be able to exercise his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief. In a worst-case scenario, Taiwan's ability to defend itself could be weakened by a lack of proper coordination and cooperation between the government and the armed forces. At a minimum there is a real chance that the ongoing project of military reform could be stalled or delayed.

Uncertainty is in the air. Rumors have emerged that several generals will refuse to bow to the president's picture. Of course, since this practice smacks of antidemocratic cults of personality, if these officers succeed in abolishing it, they may inadvertently further the cause of military depoliticization.

The fact that incumbent defense minister Tang Fei (唐飛) has thus far declined renomination (although apparently not for political reasons) is forcing Chen to identify a new person.

Lee's assertion of control took years to accomplish. Taiwan has certainly progressed since then, but not even the most optimistic observer would assume Chen could finish the task overnight. How the armed forces receive Chen's appointee will be the first indicator.