The KMT may be down, but it's not out yet

A Taiwanese diplomat once told me that the new KMT headquar-ters was constructed with the guidance of a respected feng shui (風水) expert. But, as the now-opposition party headquarters gets covered with egg and Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) rolls in his grave, it would seem heaven and earth have forsaken the KMT.

But despite the historic and surreal events of the last several days, Lien Chan's (連戰) loss and the resulting chaos within the party carry in them the seeds of victory in 2004. The question is the degree to which the future KMT will resemble the one we have known for 50 years.

One key element in the party's future makeup will be a new generation of "young Turks" that will come to symbolize the "New KMT." They will be young enough to distance themselves from the Lien/Lee generation and all the stigma that now holds, but experienced enough in KMT tactics to adapt them to a new era.

As we transport ourselves four years into the future, the candi-date's image takes shape. He is young and therefore not painted with the same brush as the old generation. He is more in touch with popular sentiments than the aloof current leaders. He has been loyal to them, however, making him acceptable to both generations of party leaders. And, he has a proven record of beating Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). He is, of course, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).

Seemingly aware of the new power dynamic taking shape, Ma has already distanced himself from the old establishment. The fact that Ma resigned his post on the KMT's policy-making committee and that his attempt to deliver the protesters' demands to Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) might be been seen as an act of disloyalty, does not conflict with his chances of being a rising star in the New KMT.

On March 18, acquiring power in the party through seniority and respect for the hierarchy went out the window. The "New KMT" leaders will circumvent these lines and draw their power directly from the electorate. As Taiwan's mass-media democracy solidifies, public recognition and popularity will have more power than any post in the party's structure, a reality of modern power that James Soong (宋楚瑜) knows all too well and Lien learned too late.

Ma became the mayor of Taipei, not because of party affiliation but because his style was very appealing to voters. The decreasing importance of party affiliation and the corresponding rise in that of style and personal appeal, work in the favor of any party that can find and package the right candidate.

Chen's victory in itself also presents the "New KMT" with an opportunity to prepare for 2004. Chen has inherited a bureaucracy of civil servants that owe their positions to 50 years of special favors and connections. Their interests are in direct conflict with Chen's success, but Chen can't fire them all. Indeed, he will depend on their experience and knowledge.

At best, policy implementation will involve considerable bargaining with this vast nomenklatura that retains the ability to prevent Chen from achieving many of his promised reforms. At worst, the KMT has in its hands a tool with which to block Chen's efforts at every turn. After four years of a lame-duck president that can get little done, the KMT can declare "we told you so; that's what happens when you elect the inexperienced DPP." Would the KMT really resort to such cynical tactics? Is the Pope Catholic?