After the major presidential candidates announced their cross-strait policies -- differing in rhetoric but similar in essence -- China released a "White Paper on Taiwan" on Feb. 21. Behind the 11,000-character document, there is one clear and simple message -- everyone should shut up and stop day-dreaming about the future relationship between China and Taiwan. Unless the Taiwanese accept the "one China" formula and lay out an approach to peaceful unification, they will find themselves facing military combat.
Beijing's verbal attack, though anticipated and containing nothing new, has inspired greater concern than China's missile launches in 1996, ahead of Taiwan's first direct presidential election.
The timing of Beijing's warning deserves attention, especially after the three leading presidential candidates displayed somewhat moderate attitudes toward Beijing when announcing their cross-strait policy platforms.
In order to counteract criticism from other camps over his stance on independence, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨) candidate Chen Shiu-bian (陳水扁) reiterated his pledge not to provoke China by unilaterally promoting independence through a referendum and putting the "special state-to-state" scenario into the constitution once elected. Washington saw Chen's declaration as a friendly gesture, an indication of the moderate progress the DPP leader has made in revising his pro-independence stance.
Vice President Lien Chan(連戰), the ruling KMT's presidential hopeful, called for the establishment of official-level relations with China and the opening of the three links -- scenarios listed in the medium-stage of the National Unification Guideline(國統綱領) -- but only if Beijing showed its goodwill to Taipei.
James Soong (宋楚瑜), who is strongly against President Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) "special state-to-state" model, portrayed the cross-strait relationship as "quasi." He could find himself embarrassed by his conciliatory approach toward Beijing.
Ironically, all three presidential hopefuls' remained quiet after the release Monday of the PRC's bluntest warning to date.
Both the Mainland Affairs Council (陸委會, MAC) and Lien's camp repeated the 1992 principle of "one China with individual definition" as their formal responses to Beijing's saber-rattling. Lien's dilemma is that over-reacting will put him close to Lee's "special state-to-state" framework, which Lien has downplayed out of electoral concern.
Chen's camp tried to distracted public attention from him by saying China's hostility was directed at all three major candidates, not just Chen, since Beijing also requested an immediate timetable for reunification.
Soong's responded by saying that the Taiwanese are not afraid of China's bluffing. However, he avoiding talking about how "quasi" the relationship between Taipei and Beijing would be under such an unfavorable circumstance.
Why would the three leading candidates take such an cautious approach in dealing with the Chinese white paper? Electoral concern is an obvious factor.
In the 1996 election, when Lee was a sure winner vis-a-vis the DPP's Peng Min-ming (彭明敏), he portrayed himself as the first popularly-elected president, winning despite China's military intimidation.
The current case, however, is different. The white paper comes at a time when a rigid three-way competition is taking place and any miscalculation of campaign tactics might turn the final outcome upside down. All three major candidates have skillfully put "mutual goodwill," "peaceful resolution" and "equal basis" as their preconditions for cross-strait talks and the possibility of signing a peace or non-aggression treaty. It is natural for them to resort to such claims, instead of using a more populist strategy to react to Beijing's latest hostility. After all, they won't gain any additional political points for doing so.
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