An interesting flap has developed over the recent publication of a report by a US think tank analyzing Taiwan's national defense decision-making processes.
The report, prepared for the RAND Corporation by its Asia specialist Michael D. Swaine, was recently excerpted in a local Chinese-language defense journal, and immediately sparked an emotional stream of criticism. Swaine's findings have been criticized by defense officials in Taipei as "distorted" and "ridiculous."
Some of the readers undoubtedly got no farther than the very first sentence of the report's introduction, which reads, "The Republic of China government has no formal, institutionalized and regularized interagency process or mechanism for national security strategy formulation and implementation." Hardly diplomatic language, but then, the report was written neither by nor for diplomats.
If one reads further into the report, one finds a catalogue of serious problems in the defense establishment, serious enough to significantly weaken our ability to defend ourselves against China. His policy recommendations, which are targeted at US defense policymakers, call for increased contacts and dialogue between the US defense establishment and ours -- although he cautions against a relationship that could be misinterpreted as moving toward a genuine alliance, in order not to "provoke" China.
Among the most important questions Swaine raised is: What is the ultimate goal of Taiwan's national security strategy? Is it to maintain a strong military in order to gain political advantages in the shifting maneuvers between Beijing and Washington? Or is it to actually defeat an attempted Chinese invasion, or at least maximize the cost to China? This is something to which we also would like to know the answer.
Swaine also, while acknowledging the irregularity of foreign willingness to sell arms to Taiwan at all, strongly criticizes the lack of a clearly articulated procedure for arms procurement. The recent scandals relating to procurement activities in Europe indicate that this is a real problem. We would think that Taiwan's predicament would necessitate a stepped-up planning procedure, not a more ad hoc one.
Actually this is but one of the many problems identified by Swaine which the recently passed Defense Law is intended to address. Others include the need to clarify the chain of command and strengthen civilian and legislative oversight of military activities.
For those who are genuinely interested in an impetus for reform, we would think that the publication of such a report would be welcomed. Simply by stirring debate, it can provide a useful function, focussing public attention on the issues it raises. We encourage those who differ with Swaine's conclusions to consider the report carefully and then present equally detailed and equally objective rebuttals. So far we have seen raised hackles and bruised egos which serve no useful purpose whatsoever. The mission seems to be to contain PR damage rather than sensibly address the issues Swaine raises concerning Taiwan's defense preparedness.
Ideally there should be more such reports, and most of them should be written by local analysts. Unfortunately, there are very few such analysts able to do so. Most of those who have the requisite expertise are employed directly by the defense establishment, the culture of which is, as its reaction to Swaine's assessment shows, not conducive to constructive criticism. The few local civilian scholars who may undertake such analysis are similarly hampered in their work by dependence on personal relations within the criticism-averse military for their sources of information.
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