A worrying shift in Jiang's position

Chinese president Jiang Zemin (|蕞A民) recently gave a number of speeches on human rights in China. On the eve of its National Day he declared that "the Chinese nation (??華民族) historically respects human integrity and values. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led the people to engage in revolution, development and reforms for the purpose of realizing people's freedom, democracy and human rights."

In a subsequent speech given in Great Britain he said in English that the "Republic of China" (ROC, ??華民國) historically respects human integrity and values. A slip of the tongue perhaps. In any case, it became something of a joke in international political circles. Jiang undoubtedly intended to express the same sentiments as his National Day speech.

It is a worrying change of stance, nevertheless. Previously, China's consistent position when facing international criticism of its human rights record has emphasized that China is at "a preliminary stage of socialism," where feeding its 1.2 billion population and upholding their right to survival is the fulfillment of the "foremost human right." This position may be flawed, but at least it recognizes that China has room for improvement in terms of human rights and democracy. In his recent statement, Jiang has, overnight, projected China as a model of freedom, democracy and human rights. This change is in line with Jiang's shift toward establishing his own personal dictatorship, as well as an unfortunate sign that Chinese politics is making a "left turn."

The shift from the totalitarian dictatorship of the Mao Zedong (?翾A東) era to liberalization under Deng Xiaoping (鄧?p?) suggested that reform was taking place in China. During the Hu Yaobang (-J耀?) and Zhao Ziyang (趙紫陽) era, reform even made its way onto the party's agenda.

Unfortunately, Deng had second thoughts and interrupted the reform process with the Tiananmen Square massacre. At the time, Jiang, who came onto the political scene by suppressing dissidents, was transferred into a central government position to help in "emergency relief measures."

Later on, Jiang used his position to denounce others, taking control of the military in the process.

Jiang then defeated his political enemies, "the Beijing Gang" (北京幫), through an anti-corruption campaign, following this by forcing the retirement of Qiao Shi (3鴠?/CHINESE>).

Later, Jiang secured his throne by transferring high-ranking military officials and "local barons" away from their traditional power bases. Not long ago, he conducted a military inspection for the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, where his promotion of "the third generation core" (2?T代核?? leadership was little more than a move to establish a cult of personality centered on himself.

Since Jiang gained a controlling position, he has been monopolizing power inside the party for his own interests.

For example, the reform of state-run enterprises and the negotiations over WTO entry, which were formally the territory of Prime Minister Zhu Rongji (|黑靚?, are now dominated by Jiang.

Even more obvious is the crackdown on Falun Gong (法輪功), in which he has completely overreacted despite opposition both from within and outside the party.

While traveling overseas, Jiang treated all criticism of China's democracy and human rights problems as a mere "nuisance." Now he cannot even be bothered to hide what he is up to.