Chen works toward China platform

When the Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨) held its first-ever intra-party debates on China policy in mid-February, 1998, Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), then the Taipei City mayor, was absent. Chen was later questioned by the public on his "real" stance on cross-strait relations, for he was the hottest political heavyweight in the party at that time.

On Sept. 20, 1999, Chen, as the DPP's presidential candidate for the year 2000, unveiled a five-point China policy platform for normalizing cross-strait relations. In addition to advocating a comprehensive dialogue with Beijing based on equal footing and the establishment of military confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs), Chen also expressed his willingness to sign a peace agreement or treaty with China, to make a personal visit to the mainland once he is elected as the president next March, and allow a conditional lifting of the ban on direct links between Taiwan and China.

What has changed Chen's mentality and his idea of Taiwan's relationship with China? Is he ready to convince people that he is a responsible leader who could alleviate tension and instability across the Taiwan Straits? To what extent can Chen develop a feasible approach, to distinguish himself from Lien Chan (3s戰) and James Soong (宋楚瑜), while at the same time preserving Taiwan's sovereignty and promoting reconciliation across the Strait?

To understand Chen's concept of cross-strait relations, we have to retrace the evolution of the DPP's China policy.

For the past decade, the DPP's cross-strait policy has been affected primarily by the interplay of domestically generated and institutionalized identity issues and changing international norms. That is, the appeal to independence was not only a way to enlarge its support base domestically, but also a strategy to demonstrate Taiwan's independence to the world. However, the strategic thinking, based largely on electoral consideration, also constrained its policy options, especially in the face of international pressure.

Old style DPP leaders might suggest making an early bid for de jure independence, rather than waiting for some future time when the growth of the PRC's military capabilities could change the balance of power in East Asia. This self-interested and security-oriented approach runs the risk of overestimating the nature and scale of US military support in the wake of a potential attack from Beijing. Furthermore, it also creates a "security dilemma" whereby attempts by any state to strengthen its security by increasing its own military power (in this case Taiwan's pursuit of de jure independence) provokes other states to follow suit, thereby rendering the initiating state as insecure as before.

In the post-Cold War era, DPP leaders started to modify their position on independence in1994. Former Chairmen such as Shi Ming-teh (施明德) and Hsu Hsing-liang (3信良) reiterated the party's stance of "recognizing Taiwan's de facto independence without any necessity to declare independence when the DPP comes to power" with an aim of generating more electoral support and mollifying international interests

The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 1997 Clinton-Jiang Zeming (|蕞A民) summit marked a turning point for the DPP's reorientation of its cross-strait policy. The conclusion of their China policy conference was divided by two lines of thought, led respectively by the Formosa faction's (美麗島系) theory of "boldly march west"(?j膽|頞i) and the New Tide faction's (新潮流系) "strengthen the base and march west"(強本|頞i). The leaders agreed that cross-strait exchange was irreversible and, sooner or later, Taiwan would have to go to the negotiating table with Beijing. The consensus thus was to engage in a comprehensive dialogue with China. The main difference between these two leading factions, however, was the extent and pace of "moving west."