The release of the US National Security Archive papers on "Taiwan's Nuclear Intentions" under the 20-year disclosure rule make for an interesting historical story. But is there any message for Taiwan today? That the island has undergone a breathtaking transformation in the past 20 years is no less true because it is a clich?. So what is there to learn from these old tales of subterfuge, espionage, called bluffs and the eventual abandonment by Taiwan of the nuclear option?
When it comes to US-China-Taiwan relations, very little. As the introduction to the archive material says: "It was the Nixon and Ford administrations' determination to forge a rapprochement with Beijing that motivated its efforts to regulate Taiwanese nuclear development." To which this newspaper, admittedly cynical about the motives of US administrations in their dealings with Taiwan, can only give a Gallic shrug and say "the more things change, the more they stay the same."
Then again, considering the paranoid and deluded nature of the Taiwan government at the time, with its "retake the mainland" rallying call, run by a bunch of old men from another country who felt cheated out of their birthright and were clearly intent on plotting revenge, the idea of nuclear weapons in the hands of such people could only appall. All the arguments against non-proliferation on the Indian Subcontinent in the 1990s surely applied just as well to the Taiwan Strait in the 1970s.
So, then, did Taiwan do the right thing by dropping its nuclear weapons program? Yes, if you believe that following internationally accepted norms of behavior is the only acceptable option for a respectable nation; no, however, if you believe that Taiwan has never been rewarded by the US for its compliance -- and, to the contrary, has simply seen its international standing even further undermined by successive US administrations.
Yet what is surely undeniable is that if Taiwan had then -- or even now -- considered defying the US and pursuing a nuclear weapons program, it could have said goodbye to a far more important part of its national security defenses: the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).
Indeed, while this newspaper has said before that the Clinton administration is beyond hope, we have far more confidence in the will of Congress and the American people to force a tough interpretation of the TRA on any wavering administration if push comes to shove, than we do in Taiwan's ability to develop a credible deterrent without suffering international ostracism, which would only increase its vulnerability. Trade-dependent Taiwan, facing the world's largest potentially belligerent regime, cannot indulge in the kind of blackmail that hermit-like North Korea can get away with; and neither does it have the clout, like Israel, to get the world to turn a blind eye to its breaking the "rules."
The TRA, frustratingly vague though it sometimes seems, is still Taiwan's best defense. An enhanced TRA, such as Jesse Helms' Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA), now wending its way through Congress, would be even better. So remarks such as those of American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Richard Bush yesterday, that the TSEA should not be passed because it was "inconsistent with the current administration's policy" are irresponsible in that they can only encourage Taiwan's simmering paranoia.
RSS