"Acquiescence in serial bribery" is how The Economist described America's decision to lift certain economic sanctions against the so-called Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea in exchange for a temporary freeze on testing of an advanced North Korean missile. Earlier this year, James Baker, a former secretary of state called the agreement for inspection of a suspected DPRK nuclear site "appeasement," not a term often used by former secretaries of state about their own country (New York Times, March 19, 1999).
Although these rhetorical salvos were both provoked by specific instances of American capitulation to long-standing North Korean demands, they correctly characterize the entire course of American policy toward the North over the last six years. Since before the 1996 Geneva Agreed Framework, US policy has rested on the belief that deference is better than firmness in protecting our interests and those of our close allies most likely to be adversely affected by hostile action from the DPRK. Indeed, during these six years, the Clinton Administration's DPRK policy is one of the most consistent and enduring strands of a foreign policy that elsewhere in the world has correctly been characterized as episodic and inattentive.
With sixteen months left in office, the Clinton administration is unlikely to move away from its long-standing, if egregiously wrong, policy. Indeed, now that the "legacy" mode has kicked in, we are at a period of maximum danger that the administration will accelerate its efforts to reach full normalization with the DPRK. But, since this is a matter far too important to leave to a lame duck president, in the short term we must strive to prevent any further deterioration in the American position. We must also hope that our presidential candidates seriously debate US interests in Korea, because without such a debate, the momentum established by Clinton may well carry forward into the next administration no matter who wins in 2000.
Among many remarkable aspects of the Clinton Korea policy is how directly and unambiguously it rejects the 20th century's two central lessons for dealing with dictatorships. In both the 1930s and the Cold War, the stakes for the US were far higher, because we knew, without exaggeration, that national survival was at issue. Failure to demonstrate resolve in the first case led inevitably to war, while in the second, resolute policies against the Soviet threat over decades ultimately prevailed, peacefully. Hitler wrote that Munich taught him "how to deal with the English -- one had to move aggressively." Pyongyang well understands the contemporary version. Late last year, for example, they said that "the US will be reduced to ashes and will no longer exist, if they ignite the train of war." Just to be sure they had made themselves clear, the DPRK added "if US imperialist aggressors dare to pounce upon us, we will wipe them out from this planet for good." Given the communist, totalitarian and intensely insular and indeed ignorant nature of the North Korean regime, as well as its desperate economic and strategic position, no one should underestimate these threats. While everyone can agree that we must seek to avoid a disastrous and possibly nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and beyond, it is ironic, in fact squalid, that the White House is unable to muster even a modicum of resoluteness to contain, let alone roll back, the DPRK threat. The administration's counter-argument that any toughness will inevitably lead to a North Korean first strike inverts logic. At present, the North can conclude realistically that if the US responds so limply when faced merely with threats, it will be even weaker when confronted with actual force. It can hardly be surprising that the North Koreans have drawn the appropriate conclusion, namely that President Clinton will ultimately accept almost anything they demand if he can be sufficiently intimidated.
RSS