What kind of relations should the indigenous peoples of the world maintain with modern nations? This question has long been a source of much controversy.
Some activists today believe that an "anti-colonialist" movement should continue against nation-state systems to "liberate indigenous peoples." This is because, even though the colonization and oppression of the early days may have ceased and entire nation-states may have been transformed into pluralistic, democratic states which provide welfare for their citizens, these states still inherit the legacies of the alien "colonialist" regimes of the past.
While these alien regimes may have become more subtle in their rule, the formation of pluralistic, democratic, welfare-providing states does not stop the exploitation and monopoly of power.
Another argument aims at seeking maximum social welfare and resources for indigenous people within the framework of nation-state polities. By participating within these political frameworks, joining political parties, forming lobbyist groups, or filing lawsuits, the Aboriginal elite can demand assistance from the state in developing traditional cultures, ensuring the special economic status of the Aborigines and other kinds of preferential treatment.
These two theories may not be totally at odds with each other. In fact, they can run parallel and enhance each other on certain occasions. But in the world of realpolitik, Aboriginal activists often get caught in mutual competition or even confrontation due to their different standpoints. Meanwhile, a majority of the indigenous people sway back and forth between these two theories as they try to work out the most appropriate direction. The "anti-colonialists" often criticize the other camp for being weak-kneed, for selling out the fundamental Aboriginal platform, and for shackling themselves within what is acceptable to the alien regimes in order to get themselves accepted. The "pro-welfare" camp often criticize the anti-colonialists for ignoring the hard realities and for overemphasizing confrontation against their colonialist rulers while ignoring the pressing, practical needs of the Aboriginal communities; the need, for example, to be free from poverty and the challenges of survival.
Both of these arguments can face different kinds of predicaments. The "anti-colonialist" stance is very powerful and can more easily gain theoretical legitimacy when it comes to seeking political self-determination for the indigenous people and the survival of their cultures (for example, efforts to regain Aboriginal land). These are not goals that the "welfare theorists" can achieve by themselves.
On the other hand, the "welfare theorists" see an urgency in the needs of the moment and their political maneuvers are more in sync with the overall social rhythm. They can therefore more easily win popular support or win promises and solutions from the state. But when it comes to long-term issues such as ethnic self-determination, cultural dignity or the restoration of traditional lifestyles, the pro-welfare camp is either powerless or forced to downplay the importance of the issue. Also, in the process of seeking benefits and preferential treatment, the small circles of Aboriginal elites close to the power center and resources often receive the biggest chunk of the benefits. Or the representatives of Aboriginal communities may create or aggravate class gaps within their communities.
Since the 1980s, Taiwan's Aboriginal movements have oscillated back and forth between "anti-colonialism" and the "fight for welfare." The movements, for example, that sought to break the myth of supposed Han benefactors like Wu Feng (吳鳳), restore the right to self-naming and regain Aboriginal land were relatively more inclined toward the "anti-colonialist" position. But the Association for the Rights of Indigenous People (原住民權利促進會) -- the foremost Aboriginal group at the time -- also demanded the establishment of a Cabinet-level agency on Aboriginal affairs. In 1996, the Executive Yuan established the Council of Aboriginal Affairs. In 1997, "pluralistic culture" and the Aboriginal rights to development were incorporated into the Constitution. Taipei City and Taipei County both established Aboriginal affairs departments. In the process, a first batch of "anti-colonialist" Aboriginal activists were absorbed into the government system and "Aboriginal welfare" became a prime area of work for the government, and an arena for struggle between the interests concerned. A number of movements, however, including that of the Orchid Island's Tao tribe to rid their home of nuclear waste, the struggles against national park programs and the Taiwan Forestry Bureau (林務局), and the "Aboriginal autonomy" issues raised by various tribes, seem to be pushing the Aboriginal movements back into the "anti-colonialist" orbit.
The Academia Sinica recently completed a telephone survey on the social tendencies of Taiwan's indigenous people. More than 600 Aboriginal adults were interviewed during the survey. Extensive questions were asked on their views of themselves and their social relationships. The survey results indicate that most indigenous people live on agriculture, fishing, livestock farming and labor. Their income levels still fall significantly short of the overall average. They are also particularly vulnerable to health problems.
But the survey touches very little on the indigenous people's relations with the state. Most of the questions raised in the survey are long on "welfare" issues and short on "anti-colonialist" awareness. One question, for example, asks: "Should indigenous people receive preferential treatment from the government?" More than 80 percent of the respondents said they should, while 6.9 percent said they "kind of should" (
Even though the state's bias against minorities is already inherent in concepts like "government care for the Aborigines," the high approval rates here also reflect the very real needs of the indigenous people. In fact, there is often pressure to increase preferential treatment in loans, school admission, employment, cultural activities and other special welfare.
On the other hand, the so-called "government care" is based on the Executive Yuan's criteria for Aboriginal status (
In the past, the government's Aboriginal policies were formulated on the basis of modernization and other so-called "overall" needs -- such as national parks, wildlife preserves, nuclear waste storage sites and subsidies for the economic development of disadvantaged ethnic groups. Since the First National Conference on Aboriginal Culture in 1994, state policy has put more emphasis on "pluralistic" cultural education (including mother-tongue training), and a variety of activities that recognize Aboriginal cultures. But more often than not, the main concern of the media and government officials is about the problems facing Aboriginal laborers working in metropolitan areas. The recent survey also shows that most of the Aboriginal people (about 72 percent) still feel they are subject to unfair treatment and hope to live in their "home villages."
This finding tells us something about the government's future role. The solution to today's "Aboriginal issues" should focus on "home villages," including the homes of the "plains" Aboriginal people such as the Ami and the Puyuma. We must face the whole range of land, economic and cultural issues instead of raising simplistic partial solutions.
The predicament of the Aboriginal people is a collective problem: they have gradually lost their land and their traditional cultures have no immediate value for survival. To revitalize the Aboriginal people, we need to revitalize their cultures, empower their organizations and develop new ways of thinking and motivation. There is no simple prescription for an all-round Aboriginal policy. The state will have to realize that it is not merely dealing with "underprivileged groups" in remote areas, but with the oppression of a systemic "racism." When it comes to Aboriginal issues, the government should work toward safeguarding Aboriginal home lands as well as opposing racism, corporate monopoly on development and class oppression.
Chang Mau-kuei is a research fellow at the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica.
Translated by Francis Huang.
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