Eyes on the Bush-Jiang summit

With the summit between US President George W. Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) less than two months away, the think tanks are busy setting up seminars related to the meeting. They will produce papers that will render advice to the administration, or at least influence those in government preparing papers for the event.

As of this writing, I count about seven such seminars in the Washington area alone. At the same time, Beijing is beginning its public relations efforts with a "new" policy toward Taiwan and Taiwan continues its assurances that its policy toward Beijing remains unchanged. Reality is that in both cases, these policies are just the reverse.

In a recent article, Bonnie Glazer tells us that her informants in the Chinese government say Beijing will now pursue a new policy of pressing Washington to control Taiwan's indepen-dence tendencies, while strength-ening its military capabilities at the same time ("Beijing pursuing a new policy toward Taiwan," Sept. 3, page 8). That China wants to weaken US support for Taiwan while building a more credible military option is not new. It would be more accurate for them to say they will attempt to follow the same policy that succeeded with the last administration.

In its preparations for the summit, Beijing will likely press very hard to exact a public statement from the US that it shares some of Beijing's concerns about Taiwan. They are likely to argue that they have a common interest in avoiding a formal declaration of Taiwan independence as it could lead to war. There will also be efforts to extract a better (for them) interpretation of US commitments. And they will take every opportunity to paint the Taiwan leadership as troublemakers out to undermine both nations.

If there is any change in Chinese behavior following the recent trend in Taiwan's policies, it is in its relatively mild reaction to them. Perhaps there is a reluctance to threaten the still growing economic interchange between China and Taiwan. The opportunities this presents Beijing for drawing Taiwan even closer into its orbit may outweigh the satisfaction of showing its muscle. Or perhaps it is the uncertainty of the forthcoming succession. Or both.

Taiwan, on the other hand, has made a considerable commitment in opening its economy to interchange with China, overriding the substantial reluctance by many Taiwanese who fear China's influence. The new government has given a multitude of assurances on cross-strait policies, and continuously pressed for cross-strait dialogue. In early August, however, Taiwan appeared to change its course.

First there was the complaint that Taiwan had conceded much in cross-strait relations without any return from China. President Chen Shui-bian (陳 水扁) suggested that Taiwan might have to "go its own way."

Then on Aug. 3, Chen said it must be clearly understood that there are "two countries on each side" of the Taiwan Strait and also called for referendum legislation to be passed. The opposition erupted, and the domestic and international media joined in, catching both Beijing and Washington by surprise.

The timing may have been a surprise, but the statements should not have been. Concessions have been made by Taiwan, but not returned by Beijing. Perhaps we have become too accustomed to that behavior, but this was stirring up the majority of voters in Taiwan who were not benefiting from the concessions given.

Many were concerned about the influence this was giving to China. The statement that there are "two countries on on each side" of the Strait -- something close to the "state-to-state" policy of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) -- exacted protests from the opposition in Taiwan, perhaps even more than in Beijing.

Many speculated that Chen's Aug. 3 statement was sparked by the news that Taiwan's diplomatic relationship with Nauru had been bought by China, taking it away from Taiwan. The competition for foreign relations is not new, however, but it came on top of a series of efforts by Beijing to block Taiwan's participation in international institutions, including non-governmental ones.

With the broadening of economic exchanges with China, international participation for Taiwan has become even more important. Participating in the international community is a matter of survival for Taiwan, but no one seemed to be paying attention.

The statement made by Chen on a referendum seemed to jolt Washington more than either Beijing or Taipei. Perhaps the reason was that the latter two understand that legalizing a referendum would take considerable time. In fact, unless the legislature's profile changes drastically in some future election, referendum legislation is not likely without some consensus domestically and with Beijing.

From the American point of view, the troublemaker tag is easy to stick. The relationship with China, by virtue of its size and its position in the UN Security Council, generates a very broad array of issues, some of which are of worldwide importance. To say that Taiwan's behavior will cause the cross-strait issue to come to the fore in the summit meeting is an exaggeration. The subject will inevitably be brought up by China in any case, but it will very likely require more time than would otherwise be the case.

Some of this must point to Taiwan, however. The legitimate concerns of the people about what they consider critical problems generates much pressure on leadership to do something. In both the "state to state" and the "one country on each side" incidents, there was a buildup of concern. In the first, there were worries that the US was drawing closer to China at Taiwan's expense. The second statement was prompted by concern that Taiwan's critical involvement in the international community was gradually being cut off.

The result was the same -- a need to raise Taiwan's international profile. Perhaps making these concerns better known to the public, or to friends, might generate some alternatives. It would at least lessen the surprise, and therefore the irritations that inevitably follows. As it stands, I suspect we are likely to witness a summit in Texas, with a China that will want to be seen as on its good behavior. We'll also probably see China pressing for some statement that will be seen in Beijing as a triumph over those troublemakers in Taiwan.

Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.