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US needs pragmatic China policy

US President George W. Bush's visit to China this week will be as symbolic as it will be nostalgic. Nostalgic because the date of his arrival in Beijing will be the 30th anniversary of the historic visit of former president Richard Nixon. At the same time, the visit, which is to last no more than 48 hours, will at best be one of symbolic value rather than substantive significance. But the opportunity nevertheless exists for Bush to get acquainted with the new generation of Chinese leaders and, more importantly, to convey to Beijing how the US views a rising China. Indeed, what Washington lacks today is a clearly articulated China policy.

When Nixon extended his hand to then-premier Zhou Enlai (周恩來) 30 years ago, the US had a clearly defined strategic objective -- a willingness on the part of Washington to end more than 20 years of hostility toward and isolation of Beijing, in order to enlist China's support in the challenges of retreating from the Vietnam quagmire and in competing with an aggressive Soviet Union.

China, coming out of the great political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution at the time and an adamant supporter (and export-er) of revolution in the developing world, could not have been further apart from the US in terms of ideology and social, economic and political systems. Yet, driven by their mutual distrust of Moscow, the two countries managed to work out a quasi-alignment that served their security interests well. That is, until the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union.

Indeed, the global strategic environment has fundamentally changed. The opening up of China has also changed the once radical and combative communist country for the better. China stands today as a country learning and adjusting to the international community's norms and rules. It is facing growing challenges, domes-tic and external, as it makes the transition to the next generation of leaders and closer integration into the world economy with its accession to the WTO. China's goals are continued economic prosperity and political stability.

The US bade farewell to the 20th century with an unprecedented degree of supremacy in global affairs. With the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet empire, the US stands as an unchallenged superpower. Since the end of the Cold War the US has sought to promote democracy, a market economy, consolidate alliances, undertake humanitarian interventions and prevent the rise of regional powers that could challenge its primacy. Increasingly, Washington has come to perceive China as one such power.

While there is a broad consensus in the US on China's burgeoning economic and military power, there is less agreement on the extent and implications of that power, such as what security policy Beijing is likely to adopt and the best strategy for handling change. Meanwhile, differences between the two countries increase over issues ranging from human rights, trade and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to regional security, missile defense and the future of Taiwan.

Occasional efforts by the two sides to improve bilateral relations, such as President Jiang Zemin's (江澤民) visit to the US in October 1997 and former president Bill Clinton's visit to China in June 1998, are undermined by the recurrence of incidents that reflect lingering, if not deepening, mutual suspicions, distrust and sometimes even outright hostility.

Bush came into office after promising in his campaign to treat China as a strategic competitor. He has stick to his promise. The bilateral relationship rapidly deteriorated. There was the mid-air collision of a US EP-3 surveillance plane with a Chinese fighter and the subsequent detention of the American crew, the approval by the US administration of the largest arms sales to Taiwan in years, Bush's vow to defend Taiwan at all costs and the routine granting of US transit visas to high-ranking Taiwanese officials.

Then came the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which, to some extent, provided an opportunity for a fresh start in Sino-US relations. Chinese leaders hope their public support and increased cooperation with the US in the fight against terror will help rebuild a stable bilateral relationship. Beijing wants to persuade the US that instead of being strategic competitors, the US and China can and should work as partners.

Despite major differences between the US and China over human rights and regional security issues, the two countries have pursued common interests in combating narcotics trafficking, battling international organized crime and, of course, fighting terror. Many Chinese analysts suggest that responses to the tragic event could mark a turning point for enhanced consultation and expanded cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

While the Sept. 11 attacks and Bush's attendance at the October 2001 APEC leaders' summit in Shanghai have somewhat slowed the downward trend and provided some opportunity for bilateral cooperation, the foundation of post-Cold War Sino-US relations remains fragile. Many divisive issues, from missile defense to missile proliferation to Taiwan, remain unresolved. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review, released in late September last year, warns of the rise of Chinese military power and its potential to challenge US interests in east Asia. The differences between the two countries derive from their fundamentally different perspectives, interests and the dynamics of domestic politics in China as the nation approaches a change in leadership.

Bush now has the opportunity to chart a new course in Sino-US relations. But he needs a vision and a well-defined, pragmatic China policy. A clear China policy must be formulated against explicitly articulated US interests, which fall into three general categories. The first are vital US interests, ie, the security and protection of American citizens and property at home. The second are strategic interests, which include peace and stability in east Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Finally, there are normative interests in promoting and protecting democratic values and market economic principles.

To promote these normative interests, the US should help facilitate cross-strait dialogue between China and Taiwan. In the name of maintaining its strategic interests, it should engage China in regional issues, including the stability of the Korean Peninsula and south Asia. The US must also seek China's further cooperation and support in combating global terrorism. The need to build the broadest possible coalition against international terrorism requires the Bush administration to retreat from its tendency to rely on unilateral foreign policy action.

The US must determine where its interests lie and how best to protect them. This should be the basis of its China policy. That policy should envision a rising China preoccupied with domestic and external challenges, one receptive and amenable to international norms and rules and, most critically perhaps, with a leadership that does not seek to challenge vital US interests even as it differs in interpretation of US strategic and normative interests. But China could be provoked to be hostile to US interests, as was demonstrated in the aftermath of the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and there are elements in China eager to adopt such hostility at the first opportunity. Washington should formulate its China policy with these considerations in mind.

Yuan Jing-dong is a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
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